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ABSTRACT 
 A television station reports that an individual is a suspect in 
a murder case.  A newspaper reports that a business or charity is 
under investigation to determine whether it has provided funding 
to terrorists or terrorist organizations.  It is true that the individual 
is a suspect in the police investigation of the murder, and that the 
government is investigating the business or charity for possible fi-
nancial links to terrorists.  However, the suspicion is wrong, or at 
least unprovable.  As far as can be determined from the available 
evidence, the individual did not commit a murder, and the business 
or charity did not provide funds to terrorists.  If the party identified 
as a suspect or investigation target brings a defamation action, the 
defendant will assert that the report it made to the public was true 
and truth is a complete defense to a defamation claim.  The plain-
tiff, however, will assert that the report damaged the plaintiff’s 
reputation by causing the public to suspect the plaintiff of criminal 
or improper acts and the suspicion was false, so the defense of 
truth should not succeed.  Which version of “truth” will prevail in 
these circumstances?  What must be true for the defendant to avoid 
liability? 
 This is the question that this article examines and attempts to 
answer.  The answer will determine whether an innocent person 
can obtain some remedy for harm to reputation or whether the me-
dia will enjoy what amounts to an absolute immunity from liability 
when the published report is literally accurate in identifying a per-
son as a suspect or under investigation.  American courts have not 
developed a satisfactory or authoritative answer to the question of 
what is “truth” in this situation.  This article will put forward an-
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swers that are well-grounded in defamation common law and con-
stitutional law and strike a reasonable balance between allowing 
the media freedom to report on criminal investigations and provid-
ing a remedy to innocent parties whose reputation has been dam-
aged. 
INTRODUCTION 
Reportage on investigations of crime is staple fare for the 
mainstream news media.  Publication or broadcast of a report that a 
person is a suspect in, or being investigated for, criminal activity is 
an everyday occurrence.  In the United States, this seems to be ac-
cepted as a legitimate part of media publication on matters of pub-
lic concern. 
People identified in news reports as suspects or investigation 
targets are understandably much aggrieved by these reports.  Per-
sons who are correctly suspected of unlawful conduct may legiti-
mately complain that publication of such reports is premature and 
can cause prejudice in legal proceedings taken against them.  
However, the concern of this article is with those who are identi-
fied in the media as suspects, or as under investigation for unlawful 
activity, but are in fact innocent—or at least cannot be proved 
guilty.  Such persons may suffer great loss because of the resulting 
damage to their reputations and unwillingness of others to be asso-
ciated with them, even if it is soon reported that they are no longer 
a suspect.  
If there is any legal remedy for the damage to reputation 
caused by these reports, it is to be found in a cause of action for 
defamation (libel or slander).  It is defamatory to make a statement 
that puts a person under suspicion of having committed a crime, or 
having helped another person commit a crime, even if the state-
ment falls far short of asserting that the person is guilty.2  Corpora-
tions and other entities may be defamed by reports that they or 
their officers are under investigation or suspects.3  
 
2   See JOHN CLEMENT CARPENTER GATLEY ET AL., GATLEY ON LIBEL AND SLANDER 
105–07 (Patrick Milmo & W.V.H. Rogers eds., Sweet & Maxwell 10th ed. 2004) [here-
inafter GATLEY]; cases discussed infra text accompanying notes 59–88, 222–52. 
3   See cases discussed infra text accompanying notes 89–107, 253–91. 
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It is fundamental to the common law of defamation that truth is 
a complete defense to liability.  There is no liability for publication 
of matter that is found to be true in its defamatory meaning or 
meanings.4  A news report that a person is being investigated for, 
or is a suspect in, a crime may well be true in the sense that a pub-
lic law enforcement authority, or possibly a private entity, is in fact 
investigating the person for possible criminal activity or has identi-
fied the person as a suspect.  However, to the extent the report cre-
ates public suspicion that the person engaged in criminal activity, 
the suspicion is false when the person has committed no crime.  An 
element of falsity may also be found when a person is reported to 
be a suspect but did not engage in conduct that would reasonably 
create suspicion of criminal activity.  Furthermore, it has long been 
accepted that the defense of truth does not protect a person who 
correctly states that another has made a particular statement about 
the plaintiff, when the statement has a defamatory meaning that is 
false.5  For this reason, accurate reportage of a statement by a law 
enforcement officer that a person is a suspect, or under investiga-
tion, is not by definition a true publication for purposes of a defa-
mation case.  An additional complication is that the common law 
privilege to accurately report governmental proceedings might ap-
ply to reports of investigations or conclusions reached in investiga-
tions. 
The critical question for liability in these circumstances is 
“What is truth?”—in what sense must the report be true for its pub-
lisher to be protected from defamation liability?   This article fo-
cuses on the question “What is truth?” when a person has been 
identified in news reportage or commentary as a suspect in, or un-
der investigation for, a serious crime.  It will describe the reported 
 
4   LAURENCE H. ELDREDGE, THE LAW OF DEFAMATION 327–29 (1978); 2 FOWLER V. 
HARPER, FLEMING JAMES, JR. & OSCAR S. GRAY, HARPER, JAMES AND GRAY ON TORTS § 
5.20 (3d ed. 2006) [hereinafter HARPER, JAMES & GRAY]; W. PAGE KEETON, PROSSER AND 
KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS 839–42 (5th ed. 1984) [hereinafter PROSSER & KEETON]; 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 581A (1977).  In defamation litigation, pleading 
truth as a defense is known as a plea of “justification.”  HARPER, JAMES & GRAY, supra.   
5   DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS 1150 (2000); GATLEY, supra note 2, at 270–71; 
HARPER, JAMES & GRAY, supra note 4, § 5.20, at 197–98; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF 
TORTS § 581A cmt. e (1977).  
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cases in which the question has been addressed and critically ex-
amine the decisions in those cases.  The article will also consider 
whether truth for purposes of First Amendment protection from li-
ability is different from the concept of truth in the common law of 
defamation.   
Courts in the United States have not developed a satisfactory or 
authoritative answer to the “What is truth?” question.  When the 
question has arisen, American courts, unlike their counterparts in 
England and elsewhere, have failed to appreciate how much its 
resolution depends upon identification of the particular defamatory 
meaning conveyed by the report and upon the distinction between 
the literal truth of the report, the truth of the defamatory meaning, 
and truth as a basis for protection from liability under the First 
Amendment.  This has influenced decisions in prominent defama-
tion cases brought by parties identified as suspects in the commis-
sion of terrorist acts or within an investigation into funding of ter-
rorist groups, as well as cases involving more traditional crimes.     
While no single answer to the question “What is truth?” can be 
propounded as the correct one, this article will suggest answers 
that are well-grounded in defamation common law and constitu-
tional law, and strike a reasonable balance between allowing the 
media freedom to report on criminal investigations and providing a 
remedy to innocent parties for damage to reputation.  
I. FACTUAL CONTEXT: U.S. CASES 
It is important to understand the factual context in which the 
“What is truth?” issue has appeared in defamation case law.  Of the 
many reported defamation cases of recent years, only a small num-
ber explicitly or impliedly address the question “What is truth?” 
when a plaintiff complains of being identified as a suspect in a 
crime or under investigation.  Within that small number, there is 
considerable variety in the crime involved, the content of what was 
published concerning the crime and the plaintiff, the impact of the 
material on public perceptions of the plaintiff, and the harm that 
the plaintiff suffered or was likely to suffer.  The actual or sus-
pected crimes in these cases have ranged from not unusual in-
stances of homicide, theft, fraud, corruption or other unlawful con-
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duct to crimes notable for their unusual or lurid elements, the 
prominence of the people involved in the crime or investigation, or 
the public fear generated by the crime.  The reportage has ranged 
from straightforward communication to the public of the state-
ments or actions of law enforcement personnel to revelation of the 
details of non-public investigations and the investigators’ suspi-
cions, to media commentary asserting that the plaintiff ought to be 
the principal focus of investigations into the crime.  The leading 
American cases of the past decade all involve purported acts of ter-
rorism or funding of terrorism.6  Recent major cases in England 
and South Africa also involve reports that the plaintiff was a sus-
pect or under investigation for acts of terrorism or providing finan-
cial support for terrorism.7 
Some of the American cases take the very simplistic approach 
that reporting that a person is under investigation for criminal ac-
tivity is true and non-actionable when the person was in fact being 
investigated.  In Hirschfeld v. Daily News, L.P.,8 a newspaper had 
published an article stating that “the Manhattan district attorney’s 
office is investigating millionaire developer Abe Hirschfeld for al-
legedly plotting to kill a long-time business partner.”9  In a brief 
opinion, the New York Supreme Court’s Appellate Division held 
that Hirschfeld’s defamation action against the newspaper had 
 
6  See infra text accompanying notes 68–180.  For discussions of other instances in 
which individuals were pervasively portrayed by the American news media as suspects in 
major crimes but were never charged, and eventually cleared, see Clay Calvert & Robert 
D. Richards, Journalism, Libel Law and a Reputation Tarnished: A Dialogue with Rich-
ard Jewell and His Attorney, L. Lin Wood, 35 MCGEORGE L. REV. 1 (2004) [hereinafter 
Calvert & Richards, Journalism], and Robert D. Richards & Clay Calvert, Suing the 
News Media in the Age of Tabloid Journalism: L. Lin Wood and the Battle for Account-
ability, 16 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 467 (2006) [hereinafter Richards 
& Calvert, Suing].  These include the parents of Jon Benét Ramsey, the child beauty-
pageant participant murdered in the Ramseys’ home; Richard Ricci, portrayed as a sus-
pect in the widely-publicized kidnapping of a girl in Utah until she was found alive; and 
Wen Ho Lee, the Los Alamos laboratory scientist who was put under suspicion of steal-
ing sensitive nuclear secrets for China.   
7  See infra text accompanying notes 273–329.   
8  Hirschfeld v. Daily News, L.P., 703 N.Y.S.2d 123 (App. Div. 2000), appeal denied, 
713 N.Y.S.2d 463 (App. Div. 2000). 
9  Id. at 124; Mark Kriegel, DA Probing Hirschfeld Allegedly Plotted to Kill Biz Part-
ner, DAILY NEWS (N.Y.), Nov. 8, 1997, at 3.   
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been properly dismissed because “the central premise of the article 
was factually true”: a grand jury was receiving evidence “in con-
nection with allegations that Abraham Hirschfeld may have been 
involved in a plot to kill [the business partner].”10  The opinion did 
not identify the defamatory meanings conveyed by the article or 
consider whether the defamatory meanings were shown to be 
true.11 
In Gravitt v. Brown,12 the plaintiff had been an employee of the 
California Bureau of Narcotic Enforcement responsible for manag-
ing an evidence vault.13  After three hundred kilograms of cocaine 
were stolen from the vault, an assistant chief of the Bureau stated 
that the plaintiff was the “prime suspect” in the theft.14  Rejecting 
the plaintiff’s action for slander, the court reasoned that the assis-
tant chief’s statement “was not the same as saying that [the plain-
tiff] actually committed the theft, so it was not a false statement of 
fact,” and the plaintiff had not produced any evidence that what the 
assistant chief said was untrue.15 
In Jackson v. Paramount Pictures Corp.,16 the entertainer Mi-
chael Jackson sued over statements in radio and television pro-
grams that police and district attorney’s office investigators were 
looking for a video tape showing Jackson engaged in sexual activ-
ity with a young boy.17  Two district attorneys’ offices had in fact 
received reports that there was such a tape and around the time of 
the broadcasts there was some investigation into the tape’s exis-
tence and whether it could be procured.  No such tape was ever 
found.  Investigators concluded, after the broadcasts, that its exis-
 
10  Hirschfeld, 703 N.Y.S.2d at 124.   
11  One passage in the opinion states that the article’s statements about the plaintiff 
“were true and non-defamatory.” Id.  As it is implausible to interpret as non-defamatory a 
report that the plaintiff was being investigated for allegedly plotting to kill a business 
partner, presumably the court meant that the article was not actionable as defamation be-
cause it was true.  Hirschfeld was indicted on the charges before the Appellate Division’s 
decision and convicted afterwards. See Edward Wong, Hirschfeld is Convicted by Jury, 
N.Y. TIMES, June 17, 2000, at B2.   
12  Gravitt v. Brown, 74 F. App’x 700 (9th Cir. 2003). 
13  Id. at 702. 
14  Id. 
15  Id. at 705. 
16  Jackson v. Paramount Pictures Corp., 80 Cal. Rptr. 2d 1 (Cal. Ct. App. 1998). 
17  Id. at 2. 
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tence could not be established.18  The trial court and appellate 
court were of the view that the broadcasts were truthful reports that 
did not give rise to a defamation action.19  In addition, to the extent 
the broadcasts conveyed the impression that an incriminating video 
tape existed, the defendants were protected from liability because 
Jackson could not show that the defendants had “actual malice,” 
i.e., knowledge of or reckless disregard for falsity,20 as is neces-
sary when a public figure sues for defamatio 21
A. Jacobs v. McIlvain 
In Jacobs v. McIlvain,22 the Texas Court of Appeals adopted a 
different approach that resulted in reversal of summary judgment 
for the defendants, but its decision was reversed by the state su-
preme court.23  Employees of a municipal water facility in Houston 
were the subject of a news report broadcast by a local television 
station.24  Viewers were told that: 
The city’s public integrity section is investigating 
the use of city employees for private work in the 
home of the city water maintenance manager.  The 
employees of the city water maintenance division 
say four payroll employees were used, on city time, 
to care for the elderly father of Emerick Jacobs, the 
manager of water department maintenance division.  
The employees say they were sent by a supervisor 
each day to the manager’s home to care for his fa-
ther and do other tasks around the house.  On top of 
this, these same employees are putting in for over-
time so they could get their city jobs done later on.  
Police investigators who are conducting the investi-
 
18  See id. at 8. 
19  Id. at 8–9, 12. 
20  Id. at 9, 12–16. 
21  Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130 (1967), established this as a require-
ment based on the First Amendment. 
22  Jacobs v. McIlvain (Jacobs I), 759 S.W.2d 467 (Tex. App. 1988), rev’d, 794 S.W.2d 
14 (Tex. 1990). 
23  McIlvain v. Jacobs (Jacobs II), 794 S.W.2d 14, 16 (Tex. 1990). 
24  Jacobs I, 759 S.W.2d at 468. 
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gation were looking for a gun, but they didn’t find 
the gun at the Dalton Street Water Facility.  They 
found liquor bottles.  One city employee says drink-
ing on the job there is not so unusual.  The informa-
tion about the alleged theft of City time may be 
turned over to a grand jury.25 
Emerick Jacobs and another employee of the water facility 
sued the owners of the television station and the reporter who 
broadcast the story.26  The trial court granted summary judgment 
for the defendants without specifying the basis of its decision.27  
On appeal, the defendants sought to sustain the summary judgment 
on the grounds that (a) Emerick Jacobs was a public official who 
could not recover for defamation without proof that the defendants 
had “actual malice”;28 (b) the broadcast was privileged under 
Texas law as a true and fair account of an executive proceeding;29 
(c) the broadcast was truthful in all respects; and (d) the plaintiffs 
could not meet their burden of proof that the broadcast was false.30 
In a 2-1 decision, the court of appeals reversed the trial court 
and ordered the case remanded for trial.31  Summary judgment was 
not upheld on the ground of Jacobs being a public official because 
the record did not show, as a matter of law, that Jacobs had the 
status of public official and the record did allow the possibility that 
there was reckless disregard for the truth.32  The privilege to pub-
lish an account of government proceedings did not entitle the de-
fendants to summary judgment because the privilege was not abso-
lute.  It was lost upon a showing of malice, and the record 
“admit[ted] the possibility” of reckless disregard for truth.33 
 
25  Jacobs II, 794 S.W.2d at 15 (paragraphing in opinion omitted). 
26  Id. 
27  Jacobs I, 759 S.W.2d at 469. 
28  N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964), requires that a public official seek-
ing damages for defamation prove that the defendant had “actual malice,” defined as 
knowledge of the falsity of the statement or reckless disregard for falsity. Id. at 279–80. 
29  TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 73.002 (2008). 
30  Jacobs I, 759 S.W.2d at 468. 
31  Id. at 470. 
32  Id. 
33  Id. at 469–70. 
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Fact issues regarding the truth of the statements also precluded 
summary judgment for the defendants on that ground.  The sum-
mary judgment could not be upheld on the basis of truth, or the 
plaintiffs’ inability to prove falsity.34  The defendants’ argument 
was said to be, “Appellees stand by their story, maintaining that 
the essence of the broadcast was that the charges had been made.  
In other words, journalists should be able to report the very fact of 
governmental self-scrutiny.  And presumably under this umbrella 
they can publish potentially defamatory statements as a matter of 
law.”35  But, 
[m]erely alleging that an investigation was in pro-
gress does not entitle a journalist to publish free-
standing allegations which are . . . legally immune 
from examination under the law of libel. . . .  [T]he 
law does not generally immunize the propagation of 
defamatory statements.  It is no defense to say, “It is 
alleged that . . . .”   
   . . . .   
 “The common law of libel has long held that 
one who republishes a defamatory statement 
‘adopts’ it as his own, and is liable in equal measure 
to the original defamer.”36   
The evidence did not show that the “underlying charges were true 
as a matter of law.”37 
Justice Ellis delivered a brief dissenting opinion.38  He would 
have affirmed the summary judgment.  His principal disagreement 
with the majority was “with the notion that defamation occurred in 
the first place.  The broadcast said there was an investigation, and 
there was indeed an investigation.”39 
 
34  Id. at 469. 
35  Id. 
36  Id. (quoting Belo v. Fuller, 19 S.W. 616 (Tex. 1892), and Liberty Lobby, Inc. v. 
Dow Jones & Co., 838 F.2d 1287, 1298 (D.C. Cir. 1988)). 
37  Id. 
38  Id. at 470 (Ellis, J., dissenting). 
39  Id.   
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The basis of the dissent’s disagreement “with the notion that 
defamation occurred in the first place” is not clear.  It ought to 
have been obvious that defamation did occur in this case.  A report 
with city employees’ statements that a manager sent them to care 
for his elderly father and do tasks around the house on city time 
conveys a defamatory meaning about the manager.  What Justice 
Ellis may actually have meant was that there was no actionable 
defamation because the report was true.  “The broadcast said there 
was an investigation, and there was indeed an investigation.”40 
If so, the dissenting justice was vindicated when the defendants 
appealed to the Supreme Court of Texas.  The court affirmed the 
trial court’s grant of summary judgment for the defendants on the 
ground that the “substantial truth” of the broadcast had been estab-
lished.41  The broadcast was correct in its report that an investiga-
tion into the use of city employees for private work was underway.  
It was also factually consistent with the findings of the investiga-
tion.  Reporting the employees’ statements about being used to 
care for Jacobs’ father on city time was shown to be correct be-
cause 
[a]ccording to the City of Houston’s legal depart-
ment report, employees of the water maintenance 
division had gone on separate occasions with Joyce 
Moore to St. Joseph’s Hospital or to the home of 
Jacobs’ father and sat with him while he was ill.  
Sworn statements by a division employee indicate 
that on three occasions, Moore and other water divi-
sion employees would visit Jacobs’ father in the 
hospital during work hours, staying there for a half 
day or longer.  While on these visits, the employees 
were paid their regular city wages. . . .  The [Public 
Integrity Review Group] found from the payroll di-
vision office records that on several occasions, 
when these employees were absent from the office 
 
40  Id. 
41  McIlvain v. Jacobs (Jacobs II), 794 S.W.2d 14, 16 (Tex. 1990).  Two justices dis-
sented without specifying reasons. 
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for as long as four hours caring for the elder Mr. Ja-
cobs, they requested and received overtime.42 
The Public Integrity Review Group report also showed that the 
broadcast was correct in stating that police investigators found liq-
uor bottles at the Dalton Street Water Facility and that there was 
drinking on the job.  Finally, evidence that this information was 
being gathered for possible prosecution demonstrated the substan-
tial truth of the broadcast’s statement that information about the al-
leged theft of city time may be turned over to a grand jury.43  The 
court noted the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Philadelphia 
Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps44 that a plaintiff suing a media defen-
dant for a statement on a matter of public concern must bear “the 
burden of showing that the speech at issue is false,”45 but it was 
the showing of the “substantial truth of the broadcast as a matter of 
law”46 that led the Texas Supreme Court to hold that the defen-
dants were entitled to summary judgment.  In substance, the broad-
cast was regarded as true, and therefore not actionable as defama-
tion, because it was correct concerning the investigation and 
consistent with what was found in the investigation, including find-
ings based on statements by city employees. 
The state supreme court’s decision in the Jacobs case appears 
to have established in Texas law that news reports about investiga-
tions are to be regarded as true, and therefore protected from defa-
mation liability, when they accurately report the nature of the in-
vestigation and allegations made against the plaintiff.47  A recent 
example is Grotti v. Belo Corp.,48 in which the plaintiff was a doc-
tor under investigation, and eventually prosecuted, for causing the 
deaths of patients.  The court reasoned that the “gist” of the defen-
 
42  Id. at 16.   
43  Id. 
44  Phila. Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767 (1986). 
45   Id. at 777; see infra text accompanying notes 347–48. 
46   Jacobs II, 794 S.W.2d at 16. 
47   David A. Elder, Truth, Accuracy and Neutral Reportage: Beheading the Media Jab-
berwock’s Attempts to Circumvent New York Times v. Sullivan, 9 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. 
L. 551, 748–50 (2007), interprets the decision more narrowly, on the basis that the Public 
Integrity Review Group report showed the truth of the allegations.  
48   Grotti v. Belo Corp., 188 S.W.3d 768 (Tex. App. 2006). 
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dants’ broadcasts was reporting on investigations and allegations 
concerning the plaintiff and the “gist” was true in substance.49 
B.  Lawrence v. Bauer Publishing & Printing Ltd. 
In a New Jersey case, Lawrence v. Bauer Publishing & Print-
ing Ltd.,50 an intermediate appellate court’s decision sustaining the 
plaintiffs’ defamation action was reversed by the state supreme 
court, as in Jacobs, but on grounds leaving open the possibility that 
a plaintiff who was not a public figure could prevail.51  The plain-
tiffs in Lawrence were the president and secretary-treasurer of the 
Rahway Taxpayers Association.  The Association circulated peti-
tions among Rahway’s registered voters to force a public referen-
dum on a municipal appropriation for a new firehouse, which the 
Association opposed.52  The plaintiffs submitted to the Rahway 
City Clerk petitions containing over 5000 signatures.  A local 
newspaper published an article stating that an attorney53 had been 
“empowered to handle a case” against the plaintiffs “based on 
charges that forgery was involved” in the gathering of the signa-
tures.54  The article also related that the plaintiffs would be 
charged with false swearing of oaths and affidavits.  The article’s 
headline was “forgery charges may loom for Lawrence, Simp-
son.”55  In response to plaintiffs’ request for a retraction, the news-
paper published a second article asserting that the first article did 
not make any accusations of guilt, but rather reported that “city of-
ficials were turning the petitions over to the local prosecutor, 
which in fact they did, to investigate allegations of forgery and 
 
49   Id. at 775, 788–89; see also Dolcefino v. Randolph, 19 S.W.3d 906, 918 (Tex. App. 
2000); KRTK Television v. Felder, 950 S.W.2d 100, 105–06 (Tex. App. 1997). 
50   Lawrence v. Bauer Publ’g & Printing Ltd. (Lawrence I), 423 A.2d 655 (N.J. Super. 
Ct. App. Div. 1980), rev’d, 446 A.2d 469 (N.J. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 999 (1982). 
51  Lawrence v. Bauer Publ’g & Printing Ltd. (Lawrence II), 446 A.2d 469, 476, 478–
79 (N.J. 1982). 
52  Lawrence II, 446 A.2d at 471. 
53  Identified in the courts’ opinions as the city prosecutor. Id.; Lawrence I, 423 A.2d at 
659–60. 
54  Lawrence II, 446 A.2d at 471; Lawrence I, 423 A.2d at 659. 
55  Lawrence II, 446 A.2d at 471; Lawrence I, 423 A.2d at 659 (quoting Patsy Bon-
tempo, City Attorney Rules Association Petitions Improper; Forgery Charges May Loom 
for Lawrence, Simpson, RAHWAY NEWS-RECORD, Jan. 9, 1975, at A1). 
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false swearing of oaths.”56  The Rahway City Business Adminis-
trator had informed the newspaper’s reporters and editor that the 
city prosecutor was investigating whether there were incidents of 
forgery or false swearing in the petitions, including petitions with 
signatures personally witnessed by the plaintiffs.57  However, the 
plaintiffs were never accused by any municipal or other official of 
having committed forgery or false swea 58
The plaintiffs commenced libel actions for publication of the 
two articles.  The trial court ruled that the articles imputed to the 
plaintiffs commission of the crimes of forgery and false swear-
ing.59   Consequently, the defendants could only assert “the justifi-
cation of truth” if they were prepared to prove that the plaintiffs 
did commit these crimes.60  Proof that the reported investigation 
was conducted or that “forgery charges loomed” would not suf-
fice.61  When defense counsel conceded that he would not prove 
that the plaintiffs committed the crimes, the trial court ordered that 
the defendants’ truth defense be stricken from the case.62 
The Appellate Division of the Superior Court affirmed the trial 
court’s decision, saying: 
 It is not significant that defendants used the 
qualified “charges may loom” rather than  
the unconditional “charges have been made” or 
“will be made.”  The capacity to destroy reputations 
is equally great.  The sting of an accusation may be 
more pervasive when made by insinuation. . . . 
 . . . . 
 Surrounding the defamatory sting of their words 
with terms such as “reportedly,” “may be,” or 
“could possibly be” will not protect a publisher.  
 
56  Lawrence II, 446 A.2d at 471 (quoting Patsy Bontempo, News-Record Asked to Re-
tract Article on Firehouse Battle, RAHWAY NEWS-RECORD, Apr. 17, 1975, at A1).   
57  Lawrence II, 446 A.2d at 471. 
58  Lawrence I, 423 A.2d at 659. 
59   Lawrence II, 446 A.2d at 472–73. 
60  Id. at 473. 
61  Id. 
62  Id. 
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Any other interpretation of the defense of “truth” 
would provide publishers with a cloak of immunity 
in the publication of rumor, gossip and malicious 
insinuations without responsibility for the conse-
quent damages inflicted by the mere repetition in 
headlines of undocumented accusations. 
We are, therefore, entirely satisfied that a publisher 
of a statement which is defamatory by suggestion or 
insinuation, must, in order to present an adequate 
defense, prove more than that the article was liter-
ally true.  That the information was received from 
another source is not enough.  To sufficiently de-
velop the defense of truth under the facts of this 
case, defendants must show that plaintiffs had in 
fact committed the offenses or that they had been 
formally charged with criminal conduct or that po-
lice or county prosecuting authorities had an-
nounced an official investigation of plaintiffs for the 
offenses described in the articles [a privileged re-
port under New Jersey law].63 
The Appellate Division also sustained the trial court’s decision that 
the newspaper articles were defamatory per se, in the sense that 
they were not susceptible of a non-defamatory meaning.64 
When the case reached the New Jersey Supreme Court, the 
court referred to the Appellate Division’s determination of the 
truth issue without criticism, but without explicit endorsement.  
The court’s opinion stated: 
There is considerable authority for the proposition 
that the fact that defendants accurately reported in-
formation obtained from another source will not re-
lieve them of liability.  Under that analysis the de-
fense of truth does not refer to the truthful 
republication of a defamatory statement but to the 
truth of the statement’s contents.  Thus, if defendant 
published that a third person stated that plaintiff has 
 
63  Lawrence I, 423 A.2d at 660–61 (citations omitted). 
64  Id. at 662–63. 
VOL19_BOOK1_KUTNER 12/2/2008  5:44:28 PM 
16 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. [Vol. 19:1 
 
                                           
committed a crime, it is no justification that the 
third party did in fact make that statement.  Defen-
dant must prove that in fact plaintiff committed the 
crime.  Similarly, a statement that criminal charges 
were imminent would be truthful only if such 
charges were demonstrably impending. 
The trial court viewed the statement in this case as 
imputing to plaintiffs the crimes of forgery and false 
swearing and therefore imposed on defendants the 
burden of proving that plaintiffs had actually com-
mitted those crimes.  A more literal reading of the 
headline indicates that the correct interpretation 
may have been that charges of forgery and false 
swearing were forthcoming.  Whether the “truth” 
defense should be framed in terms of proof that de-
fendants committed the crimes referred to in the ar-
ticle or simply that charges concerning those 
charges might “loom” is a provocative question we 
need not decide today . . . .65 
The court did endorse the lower courts’ conclusion that the articles 
were defamatory per se. 
[I]t was not necessary for plaintiffs to prove that de-
fendants had accused them of the commission of a 
crime.  Words that clearly “sound to the disreputa-
tion” of an individual are defamatory on their face.  
The unambiguous import of the two articles is to 
cast doubt on the reputations of plaintiffs, Lawrence 
and Simpson.  The statement that plaintiffs “may 
be” charged with criminal conduct diminishes their 
standing in the community and is little different 
from an assertion that plaintiffs have actually been 
charged with certain crimes.  Hence the court cor-
rectly ruled that the articles were libelous per se, 
 
65   Lawrence II, 446 A.2d at 474 (citations omitted). 
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i.e., not susceptible of a nondefamatory interpreta-
tion.66 
Ultimately, the defendants prevailed in the case on the grounds that 
the plaintiffs were public figures and their evidence was insuffi-
cient to establish the “actual malice,” i.e., knowing falsehood or 
reckless disregard for truth, needed for defamation liability to a 
public figure.67 
C. Richard Jewell 
Jewell v. NYP Holdings, Inc.68 is the first of the cases in which 
the plaintiff was reported to be a suspect in a major act of terror-
ism.  In July 1996, during the Olympic Games held in Atlanta, 
Georgia, a bomb concealed within a package exploded in the Cen-
tennial Olympic Park.69  One person was killed and 110 people 
were injured.70  There was very extensive media coverage of the 
bombing not only because of its connection to the Olympic Games, 
but also because of what the court described as the nation’s “rap-
idly eroding” “sense of domestic security” in the wake of the 
bombings of the World Trade Center in 1993 and the Murrah Fed-
eral Building in Oklahoma City in 1995.71 
Approximately twenty minutes before the bomb exploded, a 
security guard named Richard Jewell reported the existence of an 
unattended package to a member of the Georgia Bureau of Investi-
gation, who requested the dispatch of a bomb inspection team.  In 
the interval before the explosion, Jewell evacuated people from the 
vicinity of the package, thus protecting them from death or injury 
when the bomb exploded.72  For several days, Jewell’s actions 
were described by the national and international media as heroic.73  
The tone of the media coverage dramatically changed when an ar-
ticle in the Atlanta Journal-Constitution identified Jewell as “the 
 
66   Id. at 473 (citation omitted). 
67   Id. at 474–78. 
68   Jewell v. NYP Holdings, Inc., 23 F. Supp. 2d 348 (S.D.N.Y. 1998). 
69  Id. at 355. 
70  Id.  
71  Id.  
72  Id. at 356. 
73  Id. at 355. 
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focus of the federal investigation” into who had planted the 
bomb.74  He was then portrayed as the principal suspect and as a 
person who fitted the “profile” of a bomber.75  Jewell was never 
arrested or charged, and three months later he was notified by the 
U.S. Department of Justice that he was not a target of the bombing 
investigation.76  In 2005, another man pleaded guilty to the bomb-
ing.77   
After settling defamation claims against NBC, CNN and oth-
ers,78 Jewell pursued his claims against the publishers of the At-
lanta Journal-Constitution79 and the New York Post.80  It is the 
federal district court’s opinion in the case involving the Post that 
addresses the issue of whether the media statements concerning 
Jewell were “true.”81  The court had previously determined that the 
primary “sting” of the publications complained of was that Jewell 
 
74  Id. at 356; Kathy Scruggs & Ron Martz, FBI Suspects ‘Hero’ Guard May Have 
Planted Bomb, ATLANTA J. CONST., July 30, 1996, at 01X.   
75  Jewell v. NYP Holdings, 23 F. Supp. 2d at 356.  For further details of the media por-
trayals of Richard Jewell, see the presentation by his attorney, L. Lin Wood, in Sympo-
sium, Accountability of the Media in Investigations, 7 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & 
ENT. L.J. 401 (1997).  A published interview with both Richard Jewell and his attorney 
contains much additional detail on Jewell, his actions immediately before the bombing, 
his contacts with the media after the bombing, what the media published about him, and 
how it affected his life. Calvert & Richards, Journalism, supra note 6. 
76  See L. Lin Wood, The Case of David v. Goliath: Jewell v. NBC and the Basics of 
Defamacast in Georgia, 7 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 673, 691 (1997).  
This was followed some time later by a statement from the director of the FBI that Jewell 
was innocent, and by an apology from the Attorney General.  Richards & Calvert, Suing, 
supra note 6, at 495. 
77  Richards & Calvert, Suing, supra note 6, at 494. 
78  See id. at 496.  Jewell reportedly received $500,000 from NBC. Jessica E. Jackson, 
Note, Sensationalism in the Newsroom: Its Yellow Beginnings, the Nineteenth Century 
Legal Transformation, and the Current Seizure of the American Press, 19 NOTRE DAME J. 
L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 789, 804 (2005).  The NBC Nightly News broadcast, viewed by 
more than twenty million households, had reported that the FBI probably had enough to 
prosecute Jewell and he might be arrested imminently. Wood, supra note 76, at 691–93. 
79  See Atlanta Journal-Constitution v. Jewell, 555 S.E.2d 175 (Ga. Ct. App. 2001), 
cert. denied, 537 U.S. 814 (2002); Brenda Goodman, Falsely Accused Suspect Pursues 
Libel Case, N.Y. TIMES, May 27, 2006, at A11. 
80  See Jewell v. NYP Holdings, Inc., 23 F. Supp. 2d 348 (S.D.N.Y. 1998). 
81  The issue of truth in Atlanta Journal-Constitution v. Jewell was explored, prior to 
the district court’s decision, in Brendan W. Williams, Defamation as a Remedy for 
Criminal Suspects Tried Only in the Media, 19 COMM. & L. 61, 72–75 (1997). 
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was guilty or likely guilty of criminal involvement in the Centen-
nial Olympic Park bombing.82  This, of course, could be found to 
be defamatory.83  The court also decided that to state that Jewell fit 
the “profile” of the perpetrator could be found defamatory.84  Iden-
tification as someone who fits the profile of the perpetrator of a 
major act of terrorism 
certainly “expose[s] a person to hatred, contempt or 
aversion, or . . . induce[s] an evil or unsavory opin-
ion [of that person] in the community.”  Although 
the net cast by a criminal profile may well capture a 
number of innocent people, that fact does not 
change the damaging impact on the innocents 
snared.  As in this case, a person who fits the profile 
is identified as someone who may have been in-
volved in a criminal act.  Such a false accusation is 
not without its sting or pain.85   
When, however, the court addressed the question of whether 
the Post could prevail on grounds of truth, the opinion focused on 
whether portrayal of Jewell as the prime or main suspect in the 
bombing was true.86  This was found to be substantially true be-
cause Jewell was “a” suspect when the Post articles were published 
and accurately reporting that would not have produced a different 
meaning in readers’ minds than “prime” or “main” suspect.87  Ei-
ther way, the meaning was that Jewell was suspected of planting 
the bomb and was being actively investigated by the authorities, 
and that was true.  The Post was granted summary judgment for 
this reason.88  The court did not address whether the defamatory 
meanings it had identified earlier were true. 
 
82  Jewell v. NYP Holdings, 23 F. Supp. 2d at 359. 
83  Id. at 360. 
84  Id. at 363–64. 
85  Id. at 364 (quoting Levin v. McPhee, 119 F.3d 189, 195 (2d Cir. 1997)). 
86   Id. at 367.    
87   Id. at 369.  
88   Id. at 367.  
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D. Global Relief Foundation 
The major U.S. cases on the subject subsequent to Jewell are 
related to what could be described as the nation’s even more “rap-
idly eroding” “sense of domestic security” after the events of Sep-
tember 11, 2001.  These are Global Relief Foundation, Inc. v. New 
York Times Co.89 and Hatfill v. New York Times Co.90 
In the days following the September 11th acts of terrorism, the 
federal government investigated non-government organizations 
that might be fronts for or sources of funding for terrorist groups.91  
President Bush issued an executive order authorizing the govern-
ment to freeze the assets of organizations that supported or were 
otherwise associated with terrorism.92  Reports in major newspa-
pers and broadcast media identified organizations that had their as-
sets frozen, or were under investigation for or suspected of provid-
ing funds to terrorist groups—both groups thought responsible for 
the September 11th attacks and groups whose targets were outside 
the United States.93  Global Relief Foundation, Inc., an Islamic 
charitable organization based in Illinois, brought suit on account of 
statements in newspaper reports, a television broadcast and an As-
sociated Press report identifying Global Relief as one of the or-
ganizations being investigated or as an organization suspected or 
accused of being a source of financial support for terrorism.94  
About a month after the suit was filed, the federal government is-
 
89   Global Relief Found., Inc. v. N.Y. Times Co. (Global Relief I), 31 Media L. Rep. 
1468 (N.D. Ill. 2003), aff’d, 390 F.3d 973 (7th Cir. 2004).   
90   Hatfill v. N.Y. Times Co. (Hatfill I), 33 Media L. Rep. 1129 (E.D. Va. 2004), rev’d, 
416 F.3d 320 (4th Cir. 2005), reh’g en banc denied, 427 F.3d 253 (4th Cir. 2005), cert. 
denied, 547 U.S. 1040 (2006), on remand, 488 F. Supp. 2d 522 (E.D. Va. 2007), aff’d, 
532 F.3d 314 (4th Cir. 2008).    
91  Global Relief I, 31 Media L. Rep. at 1469; Global Relief Found., Inc. v. N.Y. Times 
Co. (Global Relief II), 390 F.3d 973, 975 (7th Cir. 2004).   
92  Global Relief I, 31 Media L. Rep. at 1469.  
93  Global Relief I, 31 Media L. Rep. at 1470–71; Global Relief II, 390 F.3d at 975–79;  
see, e.g., Mac Daniel, Charity Probe: Muslim Relief Agency Eyed in Terror Link, 
BOSTON GLOBE, Oct. 11, 2001, at A7; Judith Miller & Kurt Eichenwald, A Nation Chal-
lenged: The Investigation; U.S. Set to Widen Assault, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 1, 2001, at A1.   
94  Global Relief II, 390 F.3d at 979. 
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sued an order blocking Global Relief’s assets pending investiga-
tion.95 
Global Relief, asserting that it had never provided funding to 
terrorists and did not have links to terrorists, contended that it had 
been falsely defamed.96  Suing in federal court, it alleged damage 
had resulted from publication of the reports because the level of 
donations to Global Relief had declined.97  The defendants pro-
duced affidavits showing that the government suspected Global 
Relief of providing financial support to terrorist organizations, it 
was investigating links between Global Relief and terrorist groups, 
and it was contemplating a freeze on Global Relief’s assets.  The 
defendants contended that this showed the news reports were true 
and that the defendants were entitled to summary judgment on the 
defamation claims for this reason.98  Global Relief’s contention 
was that the defendants could establish truth only by proving that 
Global Relief was guilty of providing financial support to terrorist 
groups.99 
Proceeding from the premise that the truth defense required 
proof that the “gist” or “sting” of the defamatory material was 
true,100 the district court concluded that the gist or sting of defen-
dants’ reports was that the federal government was investigating 
Global Relief for possible links to terrorism, that Global Relief was 
suspected of financial support for terrorism, and the government 
was considering freezing the organization’s assets.101  The “gist” or 
“sting” was shown to be substantially true by the affidavits submit-
ted by the defendants.102  Consequently, the defendants were enti-
tled to summary judgment.103  The reports did not impute guilt.104  
 
95  Id. 
96  Id. at 980.  
97  Id. at 981.  Contributions were said to have “evaporated” following the news reports. 
Id. at 974. 
98  Id. at 980. 
99  Id. 
100  Id.; Global Relief Found., Inc. v. N.Y. Times Co. (Global Relief I), 31 Media L. 
Rep. 1468, 1473 (N.D. Ill. 2003), aff’d, 390 F.3d 973 (7th Cir. 2004).    
101   Global Relief I, 31 Media L. Rep. at 1473. 
102  Id. 
103  Id.  
104  Id.  
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Therefore, truth did not require proof that Global Relief was 
guilty.105 
Global Relief appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 
Seventh Circuit.  The Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s 
decision, essentially for the same reasons.106  The “gist” or “sting” 
was that Global Relief was one of the organizations the govern-
ment was investigating and whose assets might be blocked.  It was 
not that Global Relief was guilty of what it was being investigated 
for.  The defendants had shown that their reports were true in this 
respect and were therefore entitled to summary judgment.  It was 
not necessary for the defendants to prove the truth of charges 
against Global Relief.107 
E. Steven Hatfill 
Hatfill v. New York Times Co.108 and the related case of Hatfill 
v. Foster109 present the strongest conflict between a plaintiff’s 
claim to a remedy for defamation and defendants’ claims of free-
dom to publish “factual” reports identifying the plaintiff as a sus-
pect. 
In the fall of 2001, shortly after the September 11th airplane hi-
jackings and attacks, letters laced with anthrax were mailed to sev-
eral news organizations and members of Congress.110  At least five 
people died as a result of contact with the letters, and the postal 
 
105  Id. at 1472–75. 
106  Global Relief Found., Inc. v. N.Y. Times Co. (Global Relief II), 390 F.3d 973 (7th 
Cir. 2004). 
107  Id. at 987.  Under Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767 (1986), 
Global Relief was required to bear the burden of proving falsity. 475 U.S. at 776–77; see 
also Global Relief II, 390 F.3d at 982.  The Court of Appeals had accepted Global Re-
lief’s contention that the reports tended to harm its reputation and therefore could be con-
sidered defamatory. 390 F.3d at 981–82. 
108   Hatfill v. N.Y. Times Co. (Hatfill I), 33 Media L. Rep. 1129 (E.D. Va. 2004), rev’d, 
416 F.3d 320 (4th Cir. 2005), reh’g en banc denied, 427 F.3d 253 (4th Cir. 2005), cert. 
denied, 547 U.S. 1040 (2006), on remand, 488 F. Supp. 2d 522 (E.D. Va. 2007), aff’d, 
532 F.3d 314 (4th Cir. 2008).  
109   Hatfill v. Foster (Foster I), 401 F. Supp. 2d 320 (S.D.N.Y. 2005), on reh’g, 415 F. 
Supp. 2d 353 (S.D.N.Y. 2006). 
110   Hatfill I, 33 Media L. Rep. at 1130; Hatfill v. N.Y. Times Co. (Hatfill II), 416 F.3d 
320 (4th Cir. 2005). 
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service was disrupted.111  There was much speculation about a pos-
sible connection between the anthrax letters and the September 
11th attacks.112  The federal government promptly launched a ma-
jor investigation to find those responsible.113 
More than half a year later, with no one yet arrested for the an-
thrax mailings, a regular New York Times columnist, Nicholas 
Kristof, wrote five columns for the Times “Op-Ed” pages that criti-
cized the FBI for being slow and incompetent in its investigation 
and criticized the administration for its failure to pay sufficient at-
tention to the dangers of “bio-terrorism.”114  In the first column, 
Kristof asserted that the FBI had been “painstakingly slow” in in-
vestigating the “handful of individuals who had the ability, access 
and motive to send the anthrax.”115  One of these individuals was 
identified as a “middle-aged American who has worked for the 
United States military biodefense program and had access to the 
labs at Fort Detrick, Md.  His anthrax vaccinations are up to date, 
he unquestionably had the ability to make first-rate anthrax, and he 
was upset at the United States government in the period preceding 
the anthrax attack.”116 
The second column said, “Some in the biodefense community 
think they know a likely culprit, whom I’ll call Mr. Z.”117  This 
and subsequent columns gave specific identifying details concern-
ing “Mr. Z,” although not his name, and reasons why he should be 
thoroughly investigated as a suspect in the anthrax attacks.  These 
included his knowledge of biological warfare agents, his position 
as a “biodefense insider” and involvement in “the shadowy world 
 
111   Hatfill I, 33 Media L. Rep. at 1130; Hatfill II, 416 F.3d at 324. 
112   Hatfill I, 33 Media L. Rep. at 1130. 
113   Id. at 1130; Hatfill II, 416 F.3d at 324. 
114   Hatfill I, 33 Media L. Rep. at 1130; Hatfill II, 416 F.3d at 325; see Nicholas D. Kris-
tof, The Anthrax Files, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 13, 2002, at 19; Nicholas D. Kristof, Case of the 
Missing Anthrax, N.Y. TIMES, July 19, 2002, at 17; Nicholas D. Kristof, The Anthrax 
Files, N.Y. TIMES, July 12, 2002, at 19; Nicholas D. Kristof, Anthrax? The F.B.I. Yawns, 
N.Y. TIMES, July 2, 2002, at 21; Nicholas D. Kristof, Connecting Deadly Dots, N.Y. 
TIMES, May 24, 2002, at 25.   
115   Hatfill I, 33 Media L. Rep. at 1130; Hatfill II, 416 F.3d at 325. 
116   Hatfill I, 33 Media L. Rep. at 1130; Hatfill II, 416 F.3d at 325; Nicholas D. Kristof, 
Connecting Deadly Dots, N.Y. TIMES, May 24, 2002, at 25.   
117   Hatfill I, 33 Media L. Rep. at 1130; Hatfill II, 416 F.3d at 325; Nicholas D. Kristof, 
Anthrax? The F.B.I. Yawns, N.Y. TIMES, July 2, 2002, at 21.   
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of counterterror”; his infuriation at suspension of the top security 
clearance he held; his use of aliases in international travel; his 
work with the army in Rhodesia fighting a guerrilla war, at a time 
when more than ten thousand black farmers were sickened in an 
anthrax outbreak; and his possible responsibility for earlier anthrax 
hoaxes, with the design of demonstrating the importance of his 
field of expertise.118  The second column opined that the FBI 
should either “go over him more aggressively . . . [or] exculpate 
him and remove this cloud of suspicion.”119  It mentioned that Mr. 
Z denied any wrongdoing and “his friends are heartsick at suspi-
cions directed against a man they regard as a patriot.”120  The 
fourth Kristof column, published about two months after the first, 
mentioned that the FBI had interviewed Mr. Z four times and his 
house had been searched twice.121 
In August 2002, Dr. Steven Hatfill, a research scientist em-
ployed by the Department of Defense, held a press conference at 
which he acknowledged that he was a “person of interest” to the 
FBI but strenuously denied any involvement with the anthrax mail-
ings.122  He described himself as a “loyal American” and as a “fall 
guy” in the anthrax investigation.123  He decried those trying to 
connect him to the mailings.124  Two days later, Kristof wrote a 
column identifying the “Mr. Z” in the previous columns as Hat-
fill.125  Mr. Z had “named himself.”126  The column said, “It must 
be a genuine assumption that he is an innocent man caught in a 
nightmare.  There is not a shred of physical evidence linking him 
to the attacks.”  However, Hatfill was wrong to suggest that the 
FBI had casually designated him as the anthrax “fall guy.”  The in-
vestigating authorities were interested in him on account of a num-
ber of factors, including not only what had been mentioned in pre-
 
118   Hatfill I, 33 Media L. Rep. at 1130–31; Hatfill II, 416 F.3d at 325–27. 
119   Hatfill II, 416 F.3d at 325. 
120   Id.; Hatfill I, 33 Media L. Rep. at 1131.   
121   Hatfill II, 416 F.3d at 327; Nicholas D. Kristof, Case of the Missing Anthrax, N.Y. 
TIMES, July 19, 2002, at 17.   
122  Hatfill I, 33 Media L. Rep. at 1131; Hatfill II, 416 F.3d at 327. 
123   Hatfill I, 33 Media L. Rep. at 1131; Hatfill II, 416 F.3d at 327. 
124   Hatfill I, 33 Media L. Rep. at 1131. 
125   Id.; Hatfill II, 416 F.3d at 327. 
126   Hatfill II, 416 F.3d at 327. 
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vious columns but also Hatfill’s failing three polygraph examina-
tions and positive responses to him by bloodhounds given scents 
from the anthrax letters.  One of the earlier anthrax hoax letters had 
been sent from England while Hatfill was there.  Kristof’s column 
found “reason to hope that the [FBI] may soon be able to end this 
unseemly limbo by either exculpating Dr. Hatfill or arresting 
him.”127  This hope was not yet realized when Hatfill sued Kristof 
and the New York Times for publication of the columns.  Neither 
Hatfill nor anyone else had been conclusively identified as the cul-
prit or charged with any crime related to the anthrax mailings.128 
Hatfill v. Foster129 arose from two magazine articles published 
more than a year after Hatfill “named himself” at the press confer-
ence.  The author of the two articles, Donald Foster, was a profes-
sor of literature who specialized in “literary forensics,” deducing 
the authors of writings.130  In addition to analysis of literary works, 
Foster had sought to apply his skills to the solution of crimes 
where written evidence, such as letters from criminals, was avail-
able.131  He gave seminars in literary forensics and served as a con-
sultant to law enforcement agencies.132 
Foster analyzed the anthrax-laden letters sent through the mail 
and other written evidence.133  He concluded that the FBI ought to 
be focusing its investigation on Hatfill.134  When the FBI did not 
respond with what Foster thought was appropriate action, he wrote 
an article entitled The Message in the Anthrax.  The article was 
published in the October 2003 issue of Vanity Fair.135  A revised 
 
127   Hatfill, 33 Media L. Rep. at 1131–32; Hatfill, 416 F.3d at 327–28. 
128   Hatfill v. Foster (Foster II), 415 F. Supp. 2d 353, 357 (S.D.N.Y. 2006); see Ben Bat-
tles, Note, Terror, Tort, and the First Amendment: Hatfill v. New York Times and Media 
Liability for Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress, 72 BROOK. L. REV. 237, 239–58 
(2006), for additional details on the anthrax attacks, the investigation, Nicholas Kristof’s 
columns, and Hatfill’s action against Kristof and the New York Times.   
129   Hatfill v. Foster (Foster I), 401 F. Supp. 2d 320 (S.D.N.Y. 2005), on reh’g, 415 F. 
Supp. 2d 353 (S.D.N.Y. 2006). 
130   Hatfill v. Foster (Foster III), 372 F. Supp. 2d 725, 727 (S.D.N.Y. 2005). 
131   Id. 
132   Id. 
133   Id.; Foster I, 401 F. Supp. 2d at 323. 
134   Foster III, 372 F. Supp. 2d at 727–28; Foster I, 401 F. Supp. 2d at 323. 
135   Foster III, 372 F. Supp. 2d at 728; Foster I, 401 F. Supp. 2d at 323; Don Foster, The 
Message in the Anthrax, VANITY FAIR, Oct. 2003, at 180.   
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version of the article appeared in the December 2003 issue of 
Reader’s Digest, under the title Tracking the Anthrax Killer.136 
The Message in the Anthrax detailed at length Foster’s analysis 
of the deadly anthrax letters and previous hoaxes, his theory about 
why the deadly letters were sent,137 and facts concerning Hatfill 
that pointed to him as the person responsible.  The article initially 
referred to the person who sent the letters as “John Doe,” but most 
of the article was a demonstration of why John Doe was Steven 
Hatfill.138  Having set forth the “evidence” and “hypotheses” that 
made Hatfill Foster’s “suspect” in the anthrax murders, the article 
concluded by saying that Hatfill had been compared with Richard 
Jewell, who was wrongly and very publicly suspected of planting 
the bomb in Atlanta’s Centennial Olympic Park,139 but “it is my 
opinion, based on the documents I have examined, that Hatfill is 
no Richard Jewell.”140  The subsequent Reader’s Digest article 
omitted the reference to Richard Jewell and some of the allegations 
in the Vanity Fair article, but it maintained what the court identi-
fied as the central theme of the Vanity Fair article—that Hatfill 
was the author’s prime, and indeed sole, suspect in the 2001 an-
thrax case.141 
There is only a brief reference in Hatfill v. Foster to the “truth” 
of Foster’s articles.  The case leaves open what a showing of truth 
would require.142  Truth is much more prominent as an issue in the 
case arising from the Kristof columns in the New York Times.143   
 
136   Foster III, 372 F. Supp. 2d at 728; Foster I, 401 F. Supp. 2d at 323; see Don Foster, 
Tracking the Anthrax Killer, READER’S DIGEST, Dec. 2003, at 152. 
137   They were sent by a scientist who was frustrated by governmental and public indif-
ference to prior warnings about the vulnerability of the United States to biological or 
chemical attacks and who believed that in the aftermath of September 11th, the American 
people were now ready to hear and heed the warnings.  As a by-product, “America’s 
leading biowarriors” would receive the recognition and respect they deserved.  The scien-
tist intended to warn people, not kill them. Foster I, 401 F. Supp. 2d at 330–31. 
138   Foster I, 401 F. Supp. 2d at 330–34. 
139   See supra text accompanying notes 68–88. 
140   Foster I, 401 F. Supp. 2d at 334.  This was followed by the disclaimer that “even if 
the FBI should find hard evidence linking Hatfill to a crime, he will remain innocent until 
proved guilty.” Id. 
141   Id. at 341. 
142   The court noted that in ruling on defendants’ motions to dismiss the action, Hatfill’s 
pleadings of the falsity of the statements written about him had to be accepted as correct.  
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Hatfill contended that the columns collectively stated or im-
plied that he was the mailer of the anthrax and that this allegation 
was factually false as well as defamatory.144  The district court be-
lieved that the columns did not impute to Hatfill guilt in the mail-
ing of the anthrax letters.145  They could not reasonably be so un-
derstood.  The reasonable reader would not think that the columns 
were intended to impute guilt.146  The columns only identified Hat-
fill as deserving scrutiny by the FBI and, in the last column, as the 
focus of the FBI investigation, while cautioning that he might ac-
tually have no connection with the anthrax letters and could be ex-
culpated by the investigation.147  The court believed that the col-
umns were accurate in their descriptions of Hatfill, his becoming 
the focus of the FBI investigation into the anthrax attacks,148 and 
“report[ing] questions being raised in the context of an ongoing 
public controversy.”149  It ordered dismissal of Hatfill’s com-
plaint.150 
Hatfill appealed the dismissal to the U.S. Court of Appeals for 
the Fourth Circuit.  In a 2-1 decision, a panel of the Fourth Circuit 
reversed the district court’s order and remanded the case.151  The 
majority’s interpretation of the Kristof columns was that the rea-
sonable reader was likely to conclude that Hatfill was responsible 
for the anthrax mailings.152  Notwithstanding the statements that 
 
The Global Relief case was distinguished because it involved a motion for summary 
judgment, not dismissal, and because Foster’s articles went well beyond reporting on an 
official investigation or offering an opinion about that investigation.  The articles implied 
that Hatfill was guilty of the anthrax murders. Id. at 338. 
143   Hatfill v. N.Y. Times Co. (Hatfill I), 33 Media L. Rep. 1129 (E.D. Va. 2004), rev’d, 
416 F.3d 320 (4th Cir. 2005), reh’g en banc denied, 427 F.3d 253 (4th Cir. 2005), cert. 
denied, 547 U.S. 1040 (2006), on remand, 488 F. Supp. 2d 522 (E.D. Va. 2007), aff’d, 
532 F.3d 314 (4th Cir. 2008). 
144   Hatfill I, 33 Media L. Rep. at 1132–33. 
145   Id. at 1133–34. 
146  Id. at 1134–35. 
147  Id. at 1133–34. 
148  Id.  
149  Id. at 1134. 
150  Id. at 1138.  The opinion implies that Hatfill conceded that he had to establish that 
the columns imputed guilt to him, on a reasonable interpretation. Id. at 1134. 
151  Hatfill v. N.Y. Times Co. (Hatfill II), 416 F.3d 320, 337 (4th Cir. 2005), reh’g en 
banc denied, 427 F.3d 253 (4th Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 547 U.S. 1040 (2006). 
152  Id. at 333. 
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the FBI should “end this unseemly limbo by either exculpating Dr. 
Hatfill or arresting him” and that readers should entertain a pre-
sumption of Hatfill’s innocence, “the unmistakable theme of Kris-
tof’s columns is that the FBI should investigate Hatfill more vigor-
ously because all the evidence (known to Kristof) pointed to 
him.”153  For the majority, the dispositive question was whether 
the columns were “capable of defamatory meaning.”154  As the 
columns under the majority’s interpretation imputed commission 
of a crime to Hatfill, they were capable of defamatory meaning and 
it was error to dismiss Hatfill’s defamation action.155  The majority 
did not explicitly address what “truth” would establish a defense to 
liability.156  But in identifying the relevant defamatory meaning as 
Hatfill was responsible for the anthrax mailings, and characterizing 
it as provably false,157 the majority opinion clearly implied that 
“truth” would be proof of Hatfill’s guilt, not merely proof that the 
available evidence pointed strongly to him or that he had become 
the principal suspect.158 
Judge Niemeyer delivered a short dissenting opinion.159  In his 
view, Kristof’s columns could not be read as accusing Hatfill of 
the anthrax crimes.  “Reporting suspicion of criminal conduct—
even elaborately and sometimes inaccurately—does not amount to 
an accusation of criminal conduct.”160  For this reason, he would 
affirm the order of dismissal.   
The more important dissent in the Hatfill case is that of Judge 
Wilkinson, delivered when rehearing en banc was denied on a 6–6 
 
153  Id.   
154  Id. at 334. 
155  Id. 
156  But see id. at 329 (noting that the court “must accept as true all well-pleaded allega-
tions and view the complaint in the light most favorable to Hatfill” because this is neces-
sary when determining whether a complaint should be dismissed under FED. R. CIV. P. 
12(b)(6)), 330 n.4 (taking Hatfill’s allegations as true). 
157  Id. at 333 n.6. 
158  A footnote to the opinion noted that at this stage of the litigation, there was no evi-
dence to show whether or to what extent Kristof’s columns were accurate reports of an 
ongoing investigation. Id. at 333 n.5. 
159  Id. at 337–38 (Niemeyer, J., dissenting). 
160  Id. at 338 (Niemeyer, J., dissenting). 
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vote.161  For Judge Wilkinson, the case was one of “constitutional 
importance” even at the stage of the motion to dismiss.162  “The 
consequences of this decision for the First Amendment run 
deep.”163  The anthrax mailings and the government’s response to 
them “lie at the heart of legitimate public inquiry.”164  It was open 
to a columnist to comment vigorously on whether law enforcement 
is properly carrying out its responsibilities.165  It was often diffi-
cult, if not impossible, “to cover the long continuum of justice in 
Joe Doe fashion without the use of a suspect’s identity or name, as 
daily media reports on criminal activity make clear.”166  The news 
media had an obligation not to deprive the public of a meaningful 
report.  “In short, . . . defendant was simply doing its job . . . a job 
that the Constitution protects.”167 
Judge Wilkinson did not contend that there was a specific First 
Amendment doctrine protecting the New York Times from liability 
in this case.  His argument was essentially that First Amendment 
considerations should have led the court to construe and apply state 
defamation law in a restrained way that would support dismissal of 
Hatfill’s action against the Times.168  He criticized the panel’s de-
cision for “push[ing] state law in a direction that . . . aggravates . . . 
the constitutional tensions inherent in the defamation field”169 and 
restricts speech on a matter of vital public concern.170  He agreed 
with Judge Niemeyer and the district court that the Kristof columns 
did not accuse Hatfill of criminal activity.171  The columns were 
therefore not “defamatory per se.”172   
 
161  Hatfill v. N.Y. Times Co. (Hatfill III), 427 F.3d 253, 253–59 (4th Cir. 2005) (Wil-
kinson, J., dissenting).  Two other judges joined in this dissent. Id. 
162  Id. at 254. 
163  Id. at 258. 
164  Id. 
165  Id. 
166  Id. at 259. 
167  Id. 
168  See id. at 255. 
169  Id. at 254. 
170  Id. at 253. 
171  Id. at 256. 
172  Id. at 256–57.  Identifying a person as the principal suspect or most likely perpetra-
tor of a very serious crime can, of course, be found to be defamatory even if it does not fit 
into the “per se” category of imputation of crime.  But the panel had reversed the district 
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Rehearing en banc having been denied, the New York Times 
petitioned for a writ of certiorari in the U.S. Supreme Court.  The 
Supreme Court denied the petition, without recorded dissent,173 
and the case went back to the district court for further proceedings.  
The Times moved for summary judgment.  The district court 
granted the motion on the ground that Hatfill was a “public offi-
cial” and “public figure” for purposes of the defamation action and 
he had failed to make the necessary showing that the defamation 
was published with knowledge or reckless disregard of its fal-
sity.174  There was no evidence to establish that Kristof knew that 
his statements were false or that he had a high awareness of the 
probable falsity of his statements.  He did not believe that any of 
his statements were false.  Based on all the information he had 
gathered, Kristof had no reason to doubt seriously that Hatfill 
could have been the anthrax mailer.175  The evidence revealed that 
Kristof did not know whether Hatfill was the sender of the anthrax 
and therefore was not certain about the truth of the implication that 
Hatfill was guilty, but this would not support a finding that Kristof 
had high awareness of probable falsity.176  The Court of Appeals 
affirmed the district court’s judgment for essentially the same rea-
sons,177 but with more emphasis on Kristof’s actual belief that Hat-
fill was the prime suspect in the anthrax mailings.  Kristof did not 
have a “high degree of awareness” that Hatfill was not the anthrax 
mailer.178 
For these reasons, Hatfill’s attempt to establish defamation li-
ability in the case against the Times ultimately failed, irrespective 
of whether he could establish that statements in the Kristof col-
umns about him or the defamatory meanings of the statements 
were false.  Ironically, within a few weeks of the court of appeals’ 
 
court’s dismissal of the action on the premise that the columns could be read to mean that 
Hatfill was the guilty party. Id. 
173   N.Y. Times Co. v. Hatfill, 547 U.S. 1040 (2006). 
174  Hatfill v. N.Y. Times Co. (Hatfill IV), 488 F. Supp. 2d 522, 530–31 (E.D. Va. 2007). 
175  Id. at 531. 
176  Id.   
177  Hatfill v. N.Y. Times Co. (Hatfill V), 532 F.3d 312, 315 (4th Cir. 2008).  It did not 
endorse the district court’s conclusion that Hatfill was a “public official,” but this did not 
affect the result because Hatfill was a “limited-purpose public figure.” Id. at 319 n.4. 
178  Id. at 324–25. 
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decision, the Times reported the FBI’s conclusion that the anthrax 
was mailed by another scientist179 and the Justice Department’s 
formal exoneration of Hatfill.180 
F. Summary and Critique of U.S. Cases 
The American defamation cases bearing on “what is truth?” 
when the plaintiff has been identified as a suspect or under investi-
gation for criminal activity exhibit several different tendencies.  
One, exemplified by the Hirschfeld, Gravitt and Jackson cases, is 
to treat the defendant’s publication as true, and therefore protected 
from defamation liability, when the publication was accurate in re-
porting that the plaintiff was a suspect or under investigation, 
without regard to what defamatory meanings were conveyed by the 
publication and whether the defamatory meanings were true.181  
Going beyond this approach, the Texas Supreme Court in Jacobs 
treated the defendants’ broadcast as “substantially true” not only 
because it was accurate in reporting the nature of the investigation 
involving the plaintiffs and the possibility of referring the matter to 
a grand jury, but also because the allegations of improper conduct 
were substantiated by the investigators’ findings and statements 
made by city employees.182 
Other cases do give some attention to the defamatory connota-
tions of what the defendant published but ultimately reach the con-
clusion that there is no liability because the publication was essen-
tially true in reporting the investigation or plaintiff’s being a 
suspect.  This approach is exemplified by Jewell.183  Having found 
that newspaper articles conveyed the defamatory meanings that 
Richard Jewell was guilty or likely guilty of causing the Centennial 
 
179  F.B.I. Presents Anthrax Case, Saying Scientist Acted Alone, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 7, 
2008, at A1. 
180  Letter Officially Exonerates Scientist in Anthrax Case, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 9, 2008, at 
A13.  The Justice Department had earlier agreed to pay Hatfill over four million dollars 
to settle his lawsuit against the government for leaking information about him to the me-
dia. Scientist Is Paid Millions by U.S. in Anthrax Suit, N.Y. TIMES, June 28, 2008, at A1. 
181   See also Jacobs v. McIlvain (Jacobs I), 759 S.W.2d 467, 470 (Tex. App. 1988) 
(Ellis, J., dissenting), rev’d, 794 S.W.2d 14 (Tex. 1990); supra text accompanying notes 
22–49 (discussing Jacobs v. McIlvain).  
182  McIlvain v. Jacobs (Jacobs II), 794 S.W.2d 14, 16 (Tex. 1990). 
183  Jewell v. NYP Holdings, Inc., 23 F. Supp. 2d 348 (S.D.N.Y. 1998). 
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Olympic Park bombing and that he fit the profile of the perpetrator, 
the court granted summary judgment for the defendant because 
Jewell was portrayed as a suspect in the bombing and that was 
true.184  The court failed to require proof that the defamatory 
meanings it had identified were 
In still other cases, there is an examination of the publication 
that focuses on whether or not it conveyed, or could be found to 
convey, the meaning that the plaintiff was guilty of criminal activ-
ity.  If the meaning was that the plaintiff was guilty, the defendant 
would not prevail on grounds of truth unless it were proved that the 
plaintiff was guilty.  But if the publication did not convey that 
meaning, on a reasonable interpretation, the defendant would pre-
vail on a showing that the publication was true in its meaning that 
the plaintiff was a suspect or under investigation.  The defendants 
in the Global Relief185 case prevailed for this reason.  The district 
court judge who dismissed Steven Hatfilll’s defamation action 
against the New York Times, and the judges of the U.S. Court of 
Appeals who would have affirmed the dismissal, were of the view 
that the Kristof columns did not accuse Hatfill of guilt.186  How-
ever, the majority in the Court of Appeals concluded that the col-
umns did impute responsibility for the anthrax mailings to Hatfill, 
and the dismissal was reversed.187  Similarly, in Hatfill v. Foster, 
The Message in the Anthrax was interpreted to “unmistakably 
impl[y] that Hatfill is guilty of the anthrax murders.”188 
In Jacobs, Jewell and Global Relief, the courts held the defen-
dants not liable because what the defendants published was “sub-
stantially” true.  The proposition that “substantial truth” rather than 
 
184  Id. at 367. 
185  Global Relief Found., Inc. v. N.Y. Times Co. (Global Relief I), 31 Media L. Rep. 
1468 (N.D. Ill. 2003), aff’d, 390 F.3d 973 (7th Cir. 2004). 
186  Hatfill v. N.Y. Times Co. (Hatfill I), 33 Media L. Rep. 1129 (E.D. Va. 2004), rev’d, 
416 F.3d 320 (4th Cir. 2005), reh’g en banc denied, 427 F.3d 253 (4th Cir. 2005), cert. 
denied, 547 U.S. 1040 (2006), on remand, 488 F. Supp. 2d 522 (E.D. Va. 2007), aff’d, 
532 F.3d 314 (4th Cir. 2008); Hatfill v. N.Y. Times Co. (Hatfill II), 416 F.3d 320, 337 
(4th Cir. 2005), reh’g en banc denied, 427 F.3d 253 (4th Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 547 
U.S. 1040 (2006). 
187  See Hatfill II, 416 F.3d at 333. 
188  Hatfill v. Foster (Foster I), 401 F. Supp. 2d 320, 338 (S.D.N.Y. 2005). 
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complete truth is sufficient to avoid defamation liability does not 
support the decisions made in these cases.  The substantial truth of 
the defamatory meaning will suffice as a defense to liability even if 
some of the details of the publication were false or not provably 
true.  However, as the courts in all three cases acknowledged,189 
there is “substantial truth” that protects defendants from defama-
tion liability only when the defamatory “sting” of the publication is 
essentially true.190   When it is reported that a person is suspected 
of responsibility for a crime, or being investigated to ascertain 
whether he has committed a crime, the defamatory “sting” that 
damages the person’s reputation is to cause readers or viewers of 
the report to suspect that the person committed or may have com-
mitted the crime.  If the person did not commit the crime, the 
“sting” is not substantially true, even if the report of the investiga-
tion or the person’s being a suspect is correct.191  A fortiori, the de-
famatory “sting” is not shown to be substantially true by produc-
tion of inculpatory evidence or accusatory statements made during 
the investigation.192  As the Texas Court of Appeals recognized in 
Jacobs,193 it is inconsistent with long-established common law to 
treat as true an accurate report of a third party’s statement that is 
not itself proved to be true in its defamatory meaning.194  The 
Texas cases treating news reports as true, and therefore protected 
from defamation liability, when they accurately report the nature of 
 
189  McIlvain v. Jacobs (Jacobs II), 794 S.W.2d 14, 16 (Tex. 1990); Jewell v. NYP 
Holdings, Inc., 23 F. Supp. 2d 348, 366–68 (S.D.N.Y. 1998); Global Relief Found., Inc. 
v. N.Y. Times Co. (Global Relief II), 390 F.3d 973, 982 (7th Cir. 2004). 
190  See DOBBS, supra note 5, at 1147–50; ELDREDGE, supra note 4, at 336–38; GATLEY, 
supra note 2, at 274–77; RODNEY A. SMOLLA, LAW OF DEFAMATION § 5:17 (2d ed. 1999). 
191  The traditional view of the truth defense is that the entire imputation must be true.  
“A plea of truth as justification must be as broad as the alleged libel and must establish 
the truth of the precise charge therein made.” Crane v. N.Y. World Telegram Corp., 126 
N.E.2d 753, 757 (N.Y. 1955); see ELDREDGE, supra note 4, at 332–38; PROSSER & 
KEETON, supra note 4, at 841–42; ROBERT D. SACK, LIBEL, SLANDER, AND RELATED 
PROBLEMS § 3.9 (3d ed. 1999). 
192  Cf. Turnbull v. Herald Co., 459 S.W.2d 516, 519–20 (Mo. Ct. App. 1970) (deciding 
that where a newspaper article reported that a quantity of jewelry was found in plaintiff’s 
home, police believed some were items taken in a burglary of a jewelry store, and plain-
tiff was arrested on suspicion of burglary and receiving stolen property, the accuracy of 
these facts did not show truth because the article conveyed the inference that plaintiff had 
burglarized the jewelry store or received jewelry stolen from the store, which was false). 
193  See supra text accompanying notes 31–37. 
194  See supra text accompanying note 5.   
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an investigation and allegations made against the plaintiff,195 have 
not been followed in other jurisdictions and should not be fol-
lowed.196 
The better reasoned decisions are those which connect the issue 
of truth to recognition of the harm to reputation and defamatory 
character of meanings other than the plaintiff’s being guilty.  The 
principal examples of this are the opinions of the Appellate Divi-
sion and New Jersey Supreme Court in Lawrence.  The Appellate 
Division recognized that publishing statements about the possibil-
ity of a person’s being prosecuted had the capacity to destroy that 
person’s reputation.197  So did the reporting of unproven accusa-
tions.198  The court held that the literal truth of the article did not 
suffice for the defense of truth.199  It was necessary to show that 
the plaintiffs had in fact committed the offenses.  The state su-
preme court did not decide what had to be proved true, but it did 
uphold the lower courts’ conclusion that the articles published by 
the defendants were defamatory per se.  The statement that the 
plaintiffs may be charged with criminal conduct diminished their 
standing in the community.  It was not necessary for the plaintiffs 
to show that the articles accused the plaintiffs of commission of a 
crime.  The decision of the Court of Appeals in Hatfill to uphold 
the defamation action because the Kristof columns were “capable 
of defamatory meaning” might well have been influenced by rec-
ognition of how damaging the columns were to the plaintiff, even 
if they could not be read to mean that he was guilty of the anthrax 
mailings, and by the belief that more than accurate reportage of 
relevant facts was required to justify reputational harm.200  When a 
 
195   See supra text accompanying notes 41–49. 
196   See Elder, supra note 47, at 728–55 (criticizing opinions in the Texas cases, Global 
Relief, and other cases which found truth in the accurate reportage of allegations about 
the plaintiff). 
197  Lawrence v. Bauer Publ’g & Printing Ltd. (Lawrence I), 423 A.2d 655, 660 (N.J. 
App. Div. 1980), rev’d, 446 A.2d 469 (N.J. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 999 (1982). 
198  Id. at 661. 
199  Id. 
200  See Hatfill v. N.Y. Times Co. (Hatfill II), 416 F.3d 320, 331–32 (4th Cir. 2005) 
(“While the defamatory language does not in express terms charge the plaintiff with a 
breach of his professional honor, yet, when aided by the innuendo, operating within the 
scope of its legitimate functions, it does impute conduct tending to injure him in his pro-
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publication could be interpreted to mean that there is a likelihood 
that the plaintiff committed a major crime, the substance of that 
meaning is not proved true by evidence of facts warranting suspi-
cion or investigation.201 
The common law and statutory privileges to publish accurate 
reports of governmental proceedings could protect defendants from 
liability when an accurate account of an investigation by law en-
forcement officials is published,202 but these privileges were not 
significant factors in any of the cases.203  In contrast, the First 
Amendment “privilege” to defame public officials and public fig-
ures has been of considerable importance in a number of cases.  
This “privilege,” more accurately described as a constitutional law 
rule limiting liability to cases in which the plaintiff proves the 
defamation was published with knowledge of or reckless disregard 
for its falsity,204 was the basis on which the defendants ultimately 
prevailed in Jackson, Lawrence and Hatfill v. New York Times 
Co.205 
 
fession.” (quoting Carwile v. Richmond Newspapers, Inc., 82 S.E.2d 588, 589–90 (Va. 
1954)).  
201  See infra text accompanying notes 221–85.  The court in Jewell recognized that stat-
ing that a person fits the “profile” of the perpetrator of a major crime damages the per-
son’s reputation and conveys a defamatory meaning, even though it is known that inno-
cent people are caught in “the net cast by a criminal profile.” See supra notes 84–85 and 
accompanying text. 
202  See infra note 390 and accompanying text. 
203  They were mentioned only in the intermediate appellate court opinions in Jacobs 
and Lawrence.  In Jacobs, the court held that the defendants were not entitled to sum-
mary judgment on grounds of privilege because the record admitted the possibility of 
reckless disregard for truth, which would defeat the claim of privilege. Jacobs v. McIl-
vain (Jacobs I), 759 S.W.2d 467, 469 (Tex. App. 1988).  In Lawrence, the court observed 
that under New Jersey law, privilege applied to true reports of formal charges of criminal 
conduct and statements about investigations issued by police department heads and 
county prosecutors. Lawrence v. Bauer Publ’g & Printing Ltd. (Lawrence I), 423 A.2d 
655, 661 (N.J. App. Div. 1980). 
204  See supra notes 20–21, 28 and accompanying text. 
205  The Texas Court of Appeals in Jacobs decided not to uphold summary judgment for 
the defendants on this ground because the record did not show that Jacobs had the status 
of public official or exclude the possibility of reckless disregard for truth. Jacobs I, 759 
S.W.2d at 470.  The decision in Atlanta Journal-Constitution v. Jewell, 555 S.E.2d 175 
(Ga. Ct. App. 2001), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 814 (2002), to classify Richard Jewell as a 
public figure was a large, if not insurmountable, barrier in his attempts to obtain redress 
for defamation. See Richards & Calvert, Suing, supra note 6, at 3–4; Goodman, supra 
note 79, at A11.   
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It is predictable that a court would rule that a public figure 
plaintiff has failed to present the necessary “clear and convincing 
evidence”206 of reckless disregard for truth when the defendant 
shows that what was reported was an accurate account of a gov-
ernmental investigation or evidence obtained or conclusions 
reached in the course of an investigation.  As reckless disregard for 
truth can be found when the defendant “in fact entertained serious 
doubts as to the truth of his publication,”207 plaintiffs can contend 
that it is reckless disregard for truth to publish material that will 
cause the public to believe that the plaintiff is guilty of a crime 
when the defendant had serious doubts about the plaintiff’s guilt.  
This view was rejected by the district court and court of appeals in 
Hatfill.208  It was also rejected in substance, although not explic-
itly, in Jackson.209  The courts were, it is submitted, correct to find 
no reckless disregard in the defendants’ uncertainty about the 
plaintiff’s guilt.  Publishing with doubt on this question, but with 
genuine belief in the facts published, falls far short of the level of 
culpability intended by the Supreme Court when it adopted the 
“actual malice” requirement in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan210 
and when it equated reckless disregard with “high degree of 
awareness of [a statement’s] probable falsity.”211  The court in 
Jackson was correct to conclude that the New York Times standard 
was consistent with a healthy skepticism that is “a normal part of a 
reputable journalist’s makeup and leads him or her to obtain cor-
roborating evidence to back up a source’s story.”212  The standard 
 
206  Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 244 (1986) (public figures and  
public officials must present clear and convincing evidence that the defendant acted with 
knowledge of or reckless disregard for falsity). 
207  St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727, 731 (1968). 
208  Hatfill v. N.Y. Times Co. (Hatfill IV), 488 F. Supp. 2d 522, 531 (E.D. Va. 2007); 
Hatfill v. N.Y. Times Co. (Hatfill V), 532 F.3d 312, 325 (4th Cir. 2008).   
209  See Jackson v. Paramount Pictures Corp., 80 Cal. Rptr. 2d 1, 14–15 (Cal. Ct. App. 
1998). 
210  N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279–83 (1964). 
211  Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 74 (1964); cf. Post v. Oregonian Publ’g Co., 519 
P.2d 1258 (Or. 1974) (no reckless disregard for truth in reporting that plaintiff was sus-
pected in the smuggling of narcotics by aircraft without an attempt to determine whether 
plaintiff was involved in smuggling).  
212  Jackson, 80 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 15. 
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did not require that the reporter hold a “devout belief in the truth of 
the story being reported.”213 
Whether reckless disregard is excluded by showing that the de-
fendant lacked serious doubt that the defendant could be guilty—
the standard applied in Hatfill214—might still be questioned.  There 
does seem to be an element of reckless disregard for damage to 
reputation by defamatory falsehood when the defendant is aware 
that reporting that the plaintiff is a suspect or under investigation 
will cause the public to think the plaintiff is responsible for a crime 
and the defendant greatly doubts that the plaintiff is guilty.  But the 
lack of serious doubt about what is reported concerning the inves-
tigation or the plaintiff’s being a suspect does warrant the conclu-
sion that the plaintiff cannot establish the reckless disregard for 
truth, or knowing falsity, that is required in a public figure defama-
tion action. 
Hatfill v. New York Times Co. is the only case in which any 
judge found the defendants’ publication to be protected from 
defamation liability by the First Amendment for reasons other than 
the requirement that public figures and public officials prove 
knowledge of or reckless disregard for falsity.215  The district court 
judge asserted, “The principle that an accurate report of ongoing 
investigation or an allegation of wrongdoing does not carry the im-
plication of guilt has long been recognized at the common law, and 
it is mandated by the First Amendment.”216  While the cases cited 
in support of this assertion217 do support the proposition that a re-
 
213   Id. 
214   Hatfill v. N.Y. Times Co. (Hatfill IV), 488 F. Supp. 2d 522, 531 (E.D. Va. 2007); 
Hatfill v. N.Y. Times Co. (Hatfill V), 532 F.3d 312, 325 (4th Cir. 2008). 
215   Opinions in other cases referred to the requirement of Philadelphia Newspapers, 
Inc. v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767 (1986), that the plaintiff bear the burden of proving the de-
famatory statement’s falsity, which displaced the common law requirement that the de-
fendant prove truth, but none of the decisions on defamation liability in these cases was 
based on Hepps. 
216   Hatfill v. N.Y. Times Co. (Hatfill I), 33 Media L. Rep. 1129, 1133 (E.D. Va. 2004). 
217   Janklow v. Newsweek, Inc., 759 F.2d 644 (8th Cir. 1985), reh’g en banc, 788 F.2d 
1300 (8th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 883 (1986); Green v. CBS Inc., 286 F.3d 281 
(5th Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 887 (2002); Basilius v. Honolulu Publ’g Co., 711 
F. Supp. 548 (D. Haw. 1989), aff’d sub nom. Polycarp Basilius v. Honolulu Publ’g Co., 
888 F.2d 1394 (9th Cir. 1989); Jewell v. NYP Holdings, Inc., 23 F. Supp. 2d 348 
(S.D.N.Y. 1998); Foley v. Lowell Sun Publ’g Co., 533 N.E.2d 196 (Mass. 1989). 
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port of an investigation or allegation of wrongdoing does not con-
vey a meaning of guilt, none of those cases posits this as a First 
Amendment requirement rather than an application of the common 
law.  Judge Wilkinson’s dissent in the Fourth Circuit also invoked 
the First Amendment.  But his conclusion that the Kristof columns 
were not to be interpreted to convey the defamatory meaning of 
guilt in the anthrax mailings was based on the premise that First 
Amendment considerations warranted a restrained interpretation 
and application of state defamation law, not any supposed First 
Amendment rule requiring that no meaning of guilt be found.218  
There is no such rule in the First Amendment doctrine applicable 
to defamation.219 
Judge Wilkinson’s dissent made a wider argument that the 
Constitution protects a news publisher when “doing its job” in pro-
viding a “meaningful report” to the public on the workings of the 
criminal justice system—one which might require the use of a sus-
pect’s name—and the action or inaction of law enforcement.220  
However, the dissent did not suggest any limitation of defamation 
liability beyond affording a greater opportunity for the defendant 
to prevail on a motion to dismiss and refraining from an interpreta-
tion of state defamation law that would restrict the type of speech 
at issue in Hatfill.  No specific constitutional limitation on liability 
for characterizing a person as a suspect was advocated or identi-
fied.  The opinions in Hatfill that would protect the New York 
Times from liability provide no basis for constitutional protection 
of reports identifying a person as a suspect or as under investiga-
tion, beyond the requirement that public figures and public offi-
cials prove knowing or reckless falsehood.   
 
218   See supra text accompanying notes 162–72. 
219   The Janklow case, cited by the district court, does support the proposition that “a 
materially accurate report of historical fact” is protected from defamation liability be-
cause the publication of true facts is constitutionally protected. Janklow, 759 F.2d at 649.  
But the possible application of this to media identification of a person as a suspect in a 
crime was not discussed in Hatfill. 
220  Hatfill v. N.Y. Times Co. (Hatfill III), 427 F.3d 253, 258–59 (4th Cir. 2005) (Wil-
kinson, J., dissenting). 
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II. DECISIONS IN ENGLAND AND OTHER COMMON LAW 
JURISDICTIONS 
The weaknesses of the opinions discussed above become more 
readily apparent when the opinions are compared with what can be 
found in analogous defamation cases from England and other 
countries that apply the common law of defamation.  The opinions 
in those cases reflect careful attention to the range of defamatory 
meanings that can be found in a statement that someone is a sus-
pect or under investigation, and to what must be pleaded and 
proved to “justify” a statement on grounds of truth.  They also 
maintain and apply the rules that the truth of a defamatory meaning 
must be established and that accuracy in repeating and attributing a 
third party’s defamatory statement does not show truth.221   
A. Chase v. News Group Newspapers Ltd. 
Chase v. News Group Newspapers Ltd.222 is an important ex-
ample.  Britain’s Sun newspaper published an issue with the front 
page headline “Nurse is probed over 18 deaths.”223 Articles in that 
issue said that a nurse was suspected of overdosing terminally ill 
children with painkillers.  The deaths of the children had not been 
seen as suspicious at first.  “But now it is suspected that they might 
have been given huge overdoses of morphine or other painkill-
ers.”224  The Sun reported that after an internal inquiry in which the 
nurse’s colleagues and some parents of child patients were inter-
viewed, senior health service officials went to the police and told 
them that the nurse was suspected of accelerating the deaths of 
eighteen children.  A “health source close to the inquiry” was 
quoted as saying that the nurse “was suspended so that her capacity 
for doing harm would be eliminated.”225  The Sun said, “The case 
already has echoes of the crimes of killer GP Harold Shipman,”226 
 
221  This article will address only a few of the relevant English cases and one case from 
South Africa.  A future article will present a more extensive examination of the British 
and Commonwealth cases on the subject. 
222  Chase v. News Group Newspapers Ltd., [2002] EWCA (Civ) 1772, [2003] E.M.L.R. 
11, 218 (C.A.). 
223  Id. at [4], [2003] E.M.L.R. at 221.   
224  Id. at [6], [2003] E.M.L.R. at 221. 
225  Id. at [10], [2003] E.M.L.R. at 222. 
226  Id. at [6], [2003] E.M.L.R. at 221. 
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the doctor who murdered patients with doses of morphine or dia-
morphine.  References were also made to Beverley Allitt, a nurse 
convicted of murdering children in her care.227 
The next day’s issue of the Sun also featured this story.  A pho-
tograph of the nurse, with her face obscured, was captioned 
“Woman at centre of 18-death probe” and described as “the first 
picture of the nurse being investigated over the deaths of 18 chil-
dren.”228  An article said, “Cops are probing claims . . . that termi-
nally ill youngsters aged eight weeks to 17 years were given over-
doses of painkillers.”229  The nurse was “suspected by NHS 
[National Health Service] bosses last year.”230  Twenty detectives 
were working on the case and the police had visited every family 
that had lost a child.231 
Eight months after the articles were published, Essex police 
announced their conclusion that the nurse did not hasten the deaths 
of any children.232  The nurse then commenced libel proceedings 
against the publishers of the Sun.  She contended that the material 
in the Sun conveyed the defamatory meaning “that there were very 
strong grounds to suspect [her] of having serially murdered at least 
18 terminally ill children entrusted to her care and of having be-
haved in an evil manner comparable to the behaviour of Beverley 
Allitt and Harold Shipman.”233  She had not been named in the 
Sun, but allegedly a significant number of readers identified her as 
the subject of the articles.234   
While conceding that the material could be found to have the 
meaning the plaintiff claimed,235 the defendants asserted that the 
articles meant that “there were reasonable grounds to suspect the 
claimant of involvement in hastening the deaths of child pa-
 
227  Id. at [8]–[9], [2003] E.M.L.R. at 221. 
228  Id. at [14], [2003] E.M.L.R. at 222. 
229  Id.; Lisa Reynolds & John Troup, Check Every Kid, SUN, June 24, 2000.   
230  Chase, [2002] EWCA (Civ) 1772, [14], [2003] E.M.L.R. 11, 218, 222 (C.A.); Rey-
nolds & Troup, supra note 229.   
231  Id. 
232  Id. at [18], [2003] E.M.L.R. at 223. 
233  Id. at [13], [2003] E.M.L.R. at 222. 
234  Id. at [5], [2003] E.M.L.R. at 221. 
235  Id. at [13], [2003] E.M.L.R. at 222. 
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tients.”236  The defendants also claimed that the articles could have 
conveyed the even milder meaning that there were serious grounds 
to investigate the plaintiff.237  The defendants made a plea of justi-
fication addressed to the first of these two meanings.  The plea al-
leged facts that, in the defendants’ view, would show that there 
were reasonable grounds to suspect the plaintiff of involvement in 
hastening the deaths of child patients.  These included the conduct 
of investigations by the health service and police, allegations made 
by some nurses during the investigation about the plaintiff’s be-
havior and her irregular administration of drugs, police suspicion 
that the plaintiff might have been stockpiling controlled drugs re-
sulting in a warrant to search her home and discovery of a small 
quantity of controlled drugs there, and the plaintiff’s subsequent 
arrest on suspicion of possession and theft of Class C drugs and 
supply of Class A drugs.238  The search of the plaintiff’s home, 
discovery of drugs and arrest of the plaintiff occurred several 
months after the articles were published in the Sun.239  Just before 
the articles were published, the police had concluded that there 
were no grounds whatsoever for arresting the nurse.  The police ul-
timately notified the plaintiff that following an in-depth investiga-
tion and review of all available information, the police had con-
cluded that there were no grounds to suspect that the plaintiff had 
played any part in hastening the deaths of any children.240 
Note that the defendants never denied that the possible mean-
ings were defamatory, and they did not assert that the articles’ ac-
count of an investigation of the plaintiff would be justified by 
proof that there was such an investigation.  Also note that the 
plaintiff never asserted that the articles conveyed the meaning that 
she hastened the deaths of terminally ill children and that justifica-
tion must be proof of her guilt.  As will be seen, English precedent 
made it advisable for the parties to concede these points.241 
 
236  Id. at [18], [2003] E.M.L.R. at 223. 
237  Id. at [49], [2003] E.M.L.R. at 230. 
238  Id. at [18], [2003] E.M.L.R. at 224. 
239  Id. at [18], [2003] E.M.L.R. at 224. 
240  Id. at [28], [2003] E.M.L.R. at 226. 
241  See infra text accompanying notes 253–71. 
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The trial court struck out the defendants’ plea of justification 
on the ground that the facts pleaded by the defendants were inca-
pable of justifying the defamatory meaning pleaded.242  The facts 
on which the defendants relied would not show the truth of the 
meaning that “there were reasonable grounds to suspect the claim-
ant of involvement in hastening the deaths of child patients.”243  
Justification of a “reasonable grounds for suspicion” meaning had 
to be based upon some conduct of the plaintiff that gave rise to a 
reasonable suspicion.244  It could not be based on “hearsay” state-
ments.245  Matters occurring after publication, such as the discov-
ery of drugs at the plaintiff’s home, could not show that there were 
grounds for suspicion at the time of publication, so they could not 
be used.246  To the extent the defendants sought to justify a milder 
meaning that there were serious grounds to investigate the plaintiff, 
the plea was rejected because what the Sun published did not have 
this meaning—the Sun clearly went further and conveyed that 
there were reasonable grounds to suspect the plaintiff.247 
The Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court’s decision to strike 
out the defendants’ justification defense.248  It endorsed the trial 
judge’s conclusions, subject to a couple of qualifications that did 
not affect the result.  First, “[t]here may be cases, of which this is 
unquestionably not one, in which . . . a defendant may rely on mat-
ters which do not directly focus on some conduct on the plaintiff’s 
part giving rise to a relevant [reasonable] suspicion.”249  The de-
fendant might rely on strong circumstantial evidence implicating 
the plaintiff.250  Second, hearsay was admissible to the extent per-
missible under the Civil Evidence Act.251  However, 
 
242  Chase, [2002] EWCA (Civ) 1772, [31], [2003] E.M.L.R. 11, 218, 227 (C.A.). 
243  Id. at [18], [2003] E.M.L.R. at 223. 
244  Id. at [30], [2003] E.M.L.R. at 227. 
245  Id. 
246  Id. 
247  Id. at [49], [2003] E.M.L.R. at 231. 
248  Id. at [66], [2003] E.M.L.R. at 235. 
249  Id. at [50], [2003] E.M.L.R. at 231. 
250  Id. at [51], [2003] E.M.L.R. at 231. 
251  Civil Evidence Act, 1995, c. 38 (U.K.). 
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[i]t remains the law . . . that if a defendant repeats a 
libel he/she has heard from others, a plea of justifi-
cation will only succeed if he/she can prove by ad-
missible evidence that what they said was substan-
tially true . . . . “[Y]ou cannot escape liability for 
defamation by putting the libel behind a prefix such 
as ‘I have been told that’ . . . and then asserting that 
it was true that you had been told . . . .”252 
B. Lewis v. Daily Telegraph Ltd. 
The liability and defense theories of the parties in Chase, and 
the judgments of both the trial court and the Court of Appeal, can 
be explained largely by reference to a line of cases going back to 
Lewis v. Daily Telegraph Ltd.253  In Lewis, two national newspa-
pers had published on their front pages reports that the City of 
London Fraud Squad were “inquiring into the affairs of Rubber 
Improvement Ltd.”254 The reports stated that “Mr. John Lewis, 
former Socialist M.P.,” was the company’s chairman.255  Rubber 
Improvement Ltd. and Lewis immediately commenced libel ac-
tions against the owners of the two newspapers.256 
The plaintiffs’ pleadings stated, “It is generally known that the 
City Fraud Squad investigate serious cases of company fraud.”257 
Rubber Improvement Ltd. alleged, “By the said words the defen-
dants meant and were understood to mean that the affairs of the 
plaintiffs . . . were conducted fraudulently or dishonestly or in such 
a way that the police suspected that their affairs were so con-
ducted.”258  Lewis alleged,  
 
252  Chase, [2002] EWCA (Civ) 1772 [39], [2003] E.M.L.R. 11, 218, 228 (C.A.) (quot-
ing Lewis v. Daily Tel. Ltd., [1964] A.C. 234, 283 (H.L.) (Lord Devlin)). 
253  Lewis v. Daily Tel. Ltd., [1964] A.C. 234 (H.L.).  Also, liability and defense theo-
ries can be explained by the development of requirements for specific pleadings on al-
leged defamatory meanings and justification of defamatory meanings. See Chase, [2002] 
EWCA (Civ) 1772, [37], [2003] E.M.L.R. 11, 218, 228 (C.A.).  Shah v. Standard Char-
tered Bank, [1999] Q.B. 241 (C.A.), and Bennett v. News Group Newspapers Ltd., [2002] 
E.M.L.R. 860 (C.A.), were the most significant cases after Lewis. 
254  Lewis, [1964] A.C. at 237.   
255  Id. at 238.   
256  Id.   
257  Id. at 239. 
258  Id.  
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By the said words the defendants meant and were 
understood to mean that the plaintiff had been guilty 
or was suspected by the police of having been guilty 
of fraud or dishonesty in connection with the affairs 
of the said company . . . and/or that he had caused 
or permitted the affairs of the said company . . . to 
be conducted fraudulently or dishonestly or in such 
a way that the police suspected that the affairs of the 
said company . . . had been so conducted and/or that 
the plaintiff was unfit to hold either of his said of-
fices [chairman and managing director].259   
The defendants denied that the words published bore these 
meanings.  The defendants also asserted justification on the basis 
that it was true that officers of the City of London Fraud Squad in-
quired into the affairs of Rubber Improvement Ltd.260  They admit-
ted that what the newspapers published was libelous.261  
There were separate trials for the libel actions against each 
newspaper’s owner.  In each, the trial judge left it to the jury to de-
cide what meaning was conveyed by the newspaper reports.  Con-
cerning justification, the judge told the jury that if they thought the 
meaning conveyed was no more than that the police were making 
an inquiry, they had to consider whether the defendants had proved 
that an inquiry had been made.262  Evidently accepting the plain-
tiffs’ claim that the newspaper reports conveyed the meaning that 
the plaintiffs were guilty of fraud,263 the juries delivered verdicts 
for the plaintiffs with large awards of damages.  
The essence of the decision of the House of Lords in Lewis is 
that the newspaper reports, as a matter of law, were incapable of 
bearing the meaning that the plaintiffs were guilty of fraud.  The 
ordinary reader would not infer guilt of fraud from the newspapers’ 
reports of an inquiry by the Fraud Squad.  At most, the reader 
would infer that the plaintiffs had conducted their affairs in such a 
 
259  Id. at 239 (references to the company’s subsidiaries omitted). 
260  Id. at 239–40.   
261  Id. at 258, 265, 270, 283. 
262  Id. at 241–43. 
263   See id. at 257–58 (Lord Reid), 270 (Lord Hodson). 
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way as to create suspicion of fraud.  Therefore, the trial judge erred 
in allowing the jury to decide whether the newspaper articles im-
puted guilt of fraud.264  Presumably, it was due to Lewis that the 
plaintiff in Chase never asserted that the Sun articles conveyed the 
meaning that the plaintiff was guilty of hastening the deaths of ill 
children. 
Lewis is particularly important in its recognition of different 
levels of defamatory meaning.  One meaning is that the plaintiff is 
guilty of wrongdoing.  A second meaning is that the plaintiff is 
suspected of being guilty.  A third possibility is that there are 
grounds for investigating the plaintiff.265  Lord Reid differentiated 
imputations that the plaintiffs were guilty of fraud, that the plain-
tiffs conducted their affairs so as to give rise to suspicion of fraud, 
and that the plaintiffs conducted their affairs in a way that justified 
an inquiry into whether there had been fraud.266  From this evolved 
the three categories of meaning found in Chase: that the plaintiff 
“has in fact committed some serious act”; “there are reasonable 
grounds to suspect that he/she has committed such an act”; and 
“there are grounds for investigating whether he/she has been re-
sponsible for such an act.”267 
In Lewis and Chase there is also recognition that “justification” 
of a defamatory meaning is based upon proof that that particular 
defamatory meaning is true.  If a statement cannot be found to 
convey the meaning that the plaintiff is guilty of a crime, as in 
Lewis, or the plaintiff never claims that what the defendant pub-
 
264  Id. at 258–60 (Lord Reid), 274–76 (Lord Hodson), 283–87 (Lord Devlin).  Lord 
Morris disagreed on this point. Id. at 266–69 (Lord Morris of Borth-y-Gest). 
265  See id. at 260 (Lord Reid), 267–68 (Lord Morris of Borth-y-Gest), 274–75 (Lord 
Hodson), 283–86 (Lord Devlin). 
266  Id. at 260 (Lord Reid).  The parties and all the judges accepted that the articles could 
bear the meaning that the police suspected that the affairs of Rubber Improvement were 
conducted fraudulently or dishonestly. See id. at 267 (Lord Morris of Borth-y-Gest). 
267  Chase v. News Group Newspapers Ltd., [2002] EWCA (Civ) 1772, [45], [2003] 
E.M.L.R. 11, 218, 230 (C.A.).  The second meaning requires “reasonable” grounds for 
suspicion on the premise that a report that a third party suspects a person of a crime is 
defamatory only to the extent that the report conveyed the imputation that there were rea-
sonable grounds for the suspicion. See Musa King v. Tel. Group Ltd., [2004] EWCA 
(Civ) 613, [25], [2004] E.M.L.R. 23, 429, 439 (C.A.).  But this premise may be wrong.  
See the treatment of “is suspected” and “is suspected on reasonable or strong grounds” in 
the King case, discussed infra text accompanying notes 294–308. 
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lished conveyed such a meaning, as in Chase, the defendant does 
not have to prove that the plaintiff was guilty even though what 
was published led readers to think that the plaintiff might be guilty.  
But if a statement conveys the meaning that there are grounds to 
suspect the plaintiff of guilt, the truth of that must be proved.  If 
the statement conveys the meaning that there are grounds for in-
vestigation, that must be proved true.268  It follows from this that if 
any of these meanings is found in a report that the plaintiff is under 
investigation or a suspect, the defendant cannot establish justifica-
tion by showing that the plaintiff was in fact being investigated or 
regarded as a suspect.269  Chase does accept that what a defendant 
must establish is the “substantial” truth of the libel, but that means 
showing that the “sting of the libel” is true.270  Showing the truth 
of a lesser defamatory meaning does not suffice.271
C. Reports on Investigation of Terrorism and Terrorism Funding 
In striking similarity to the Global Relief and Hatfill cases,272 
the most recent cases in England and South Africa bearing on what 
is the “truth” for reports that a person is a suspect or under investi-
gation also concern funding of terrorism or involvement in acts of 
terrorism. 
In Al Rajhi Banking & Investment Corp. v. Wall Street Journal 
Europe Sprl.,273 a Saudi Arabian banking company brought libel 
proceedings over an article published in the Wall Street Journal 
Europe.  The article reported that at the request of U.S. law en-
 
268   See Lewis, [1964] A.C. at 260 (Lord Reid), 274–75 (Lord Hodson), 282, 284 (Lord 
Devlin); Chase, [2002] EWCA (Civ) 1772, [48], [2003] E.M.L.R. 11 at 230; see also 
Shah v. Standard Chartered Bank, [1999] Q.B. 241 (C.A.). 
269   See GATLEY, supra note 2, at 850–51 (with “quaere” as to “grounds for investiga-
tion”).  The judges of the Court of Appeal in Lewis, whose decision the House of Lords 
affirmed, were clearly of the view that proof that there was a Fraud Squad inquiry into 
the plaintiffs would not justify the newspapers’ reports of an inquiry if the reports con-
veyed an additional meaning. See Lewis v. Daily Tel. Ltd., [1963] 1 Q.B. 340, 363 (Hol-
royd Pearce, L.J.), 395 (Davies, L.J.), 408 (Havers, J.). 
270  Chase, [2002] EWCA (Civ) 1772, [34], [2003] E.M.L.R. 11 at 227. 
271  Id. at [34], [2003] E.M.L.R. at 227. 
272  See supra text accompanying notes 89–180. 
273  Al Rajhi Banking & Inv. Corp. v. Wall Street Journal Europe Sprl. (Al Rajhi Bank-
ing I), [2003] EWHC (QB) 1358, subsequent proceedings, [2003] EWHC (QB) 1776. 
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forcement agencies, the central bank of Saudi Arabia was monitor-
ing 150 bank accounts “associated with some of the country’s most 
prominent businessmen in a bid to prevent them from being used 
wittingly or unwittingly for the funnelling of funds to terrorist or-
ganisations.”274  Accounts belonging to the plaintiff were among 
the 150 being monitored.275  The article quoted American officials 
saying that “[m]any of the Saudi accounts on the U.S. list belong to 
legitimate entities and businessmen who may in the past have had 
an association with institutions suspected of links to terrorism.”276  
The publisher of the Journal attempted to plead justification on the 
grounds that the plaintiff had associations with institutions or per-
sons suspected of links to terrorism and that the plaintiff was the 
subject of “US law enforcement interest” 277—no knowing or “wit-
ting” involvement in terrorism or financing of terrorism was al-
leged.278  The court rejected this.  Justification could not be estab-
lished on the basis of some association, as distinct from guilty 
association, or on the basis that the plaintiff was the subject of 
American law enforcement “interest” or suspicion.  Reasonable 
grounds to suspect the plaintiff of involvement in terrorism had to 
be identified.279  
The defendant then sought to plead as justification that “there 
were reasonable grounds to suspect that the [plaintiff] had been 
knowingly or negligently involved in the funding of terrorist-
related activity” and that “there were sufficient grounds for inves-
tigating whether the [plaintiff] had been and/or was still knowingly 
or negligently involved in the funding of terrorist-related activ-
ity.”280  Unlike the earlier pleadings, this version fit into two of the 
three levels of defamatory meaning identified in Chase v. News 
Group Newspapers Ltd.:281 reasonable grounds for suspicion and 
 
274  Id. at [4]; James M. Dorsey, Saudi Officials Monitor Certain Bank Accounts—Focus 
Is on Those with Potential Terrorist Ties, WALL STREET J. EUR., Feb. 6, 2002, at 1.   
275  Al Rajhi Banking I, [2003] EWHC (QB) 1358, [4].    
276  Id.  
277  Id. at [21]. 
278  Id. at [16]–[19]. 
279  Id. at [28]–[33]. 
280  Al Rajhi Banking & Inv. Corp. v. Wall Street Journal Europe Sprl. (Al Rajhi Bank-
ing II), [2003] EWHC (QB) 1776, [7]. 
281  Chase v. News Group Newspapers Ltd., [2002] EWCA (Civ) 1772, [45], [2003] 
E.M.L.R. 11, 218, 230 (C.A.); see supra text accompanying note 267. 
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grounds for investigation.  The plaintiff did not claim that the arti-
cle imputed direct involvement in funding of terrorism, so it was 
not necessary for the defendant to plead justification of that mean-
ing.282  The court held that the article could not be reasonably con-
strued to mean no more than that there were reasonable grounds to 
investigate.  Consequently, justification could not be established by 
showing grounds to investigate whether the plaintiff was involved 
in funding of terrorism.283  As in Chase, the article implied that 
there were grounds to suspect the plaintiff of wrongdoing.  There-
fore, justification could be established only by showing that there 
were reasonable grounds to suspect the plaintiff.284  The court al-
lowed the defendant to plead justification in terms of “reasonable 
grounds to suspect” to the limited extent that the defendant’s par-
ticulars set forth a basis for proving that there were objectively rea-
sonable grounds to suspect the plaintiff of knowing or negligent 
involvement in funding of terrorism.285 
A second case arose from the same article: Jameel v. Wall 
Street Journal Europe Sprl.286  The plaintiffs in Jameel were the 
president of one of the Saudi companies named in the article as 
having its bank accounts monitored and the company itself.287  As 
in Al Rajhi Banking, one of the major issues was whether the arti-
cle necessarily conveyed the defamatory meaning that there were 
reasonable grounds for suspecting the plaintiffs of involvement 
with terrorism or could be found to have some lesser meaning, 
such as the existence of grounds for investigation.  In the Queen’s 
Bench Division, the court288 ruled that the article did mean at least 
that the plaintiffs were under a reasonable suspicion of knowing or 
negligent involvement with terrorism.  It could not be found to 
have a lesser meaning.289  However, this decision was reversed on 
 
282  Al Rajhi Banking II, [2003] EWHC 1776, [3]. 
283  Id. at [12]. 
284  Id. at [19]. 
285  Id. at [80]. 
286  Jameel v. Wall Street Journal Europe Sprl. (Jameel I), [2003] EWCA (Civ) 1694, 
[2004] E.M.L.R. 6, 89 (C.A.); Dorsey, supra note 274.   
287  Jameel I, [2003] EWCA (Civ) 1694, [2], [2004] E.M.L.R. at 92.   
288  Eady, J., the same judge as in Al Rajhi Banking (I & II). 
289  Jameel I, [2003] EWCA (Civ) 1694, [4], [2004] E.M.L.R. at 95. 
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appeal.  The court of appeal concluded that while a jury might well 
find that the article had the more serious meaning, the meaning of 
the article was not so plain as to exclude a finding of some lesser 
defamatory meaning.290  The defendants in this case did not plead 
justification.  For this reason, the court of appeal was not specific 
on what lesser defamatory meaning a jury could find and on what 
would be required to justify the meaning.  Presumably, the lesser 
defamatory meaning that could be found is that grounds existed to 
investigate whether the plaintiff company and company president 
were involved in the provision of funds to terrorist organiza-
tions.291 
In King v. Telegraph Group Ltd.,292 the plaintiff’s libel action 
concerned two articles in the Sunday Telegraph.  The first article 
reported that two unnamed white men were being investigated by 
Scotland Yard “to establish whether they have committed terrorist 
offences.”293  It was “the first time since September 11 that white 
non-Muslims have been accused of involvement in Islamic extrem-
ism.”294  One of the two men was identified as a computer expert 
“linked” to a named individual who had been charged under the 
Prevention of Terrorism Act.295  The plaintiff claimed that readers 
of the article would have understood this man was the plaintiff.296  
The second article, headlined, “British Muslim targeted by FBI for 
 
290  Id. at [22]–[23], [2004] E.M.L.R. at 103–04.                    
291  See also Jameel v. Times Newspapers Ltd. (Jameel II), [2004] EWCA (Civ) 983, 
[2004] E.M.L.R. 31, 665 (C.A.).  Yousef Jameel claimed that an article in the Sunday 
Times said or implied that there were reasonable grounds for suspecting that he had di-
rectly or indirectly funded terrorism, or at least that there was good reason for investigat-
ing whether he had done so.  As in the earlier Jameel I case discussed in the text (involv-
ing different plaintiffs), the Court of Appeal held that a jury could find the article to bear 
either of these meanings.  It could also find there was no defamatory meaning. Id. at [20], 
[2004] E.M.L.R. at 676.   The court discussed whether the “good reason for investigat-
ing” meaning could be justified (i.e., considered true) on the basis of allegations others 
had made about the plaintiff’s conduct that were not proved to be correct, but no conclu-
sion was reached on this issue. Id. at [22]–[30], [2004] E.M.L.R. at 676–81. 
292  King v. Tel. Group Ltd., [2004] EWCA (Civ) 613, [2005] 1 W.L.R. 2282, sub nom. 
Musa King v. Tel. Group Ltd., [2004] E.M.L.R. 429 (C.A.).  The report of the case in 
E.M.L.R. is more complete than the report in the usually authoritative W.L.R. 
293  [2004] EWCA (Civ) 613, [11], [2005] 1 W.L.R. at 2285, [2004] E.M.L.R. at 433–
34. 
294  Id. at [11], [2005] 1 W.L.R. at 2285, [2004] E.M.L.R. at 433–34.   
295  Id. at [11], [2005] 1 W.L.R. at 2285, [2004] E.M.L.R. at 433–34.   
296  Id. at [13], [2005] 1 W.L.R. at 2285, [2004] E.M.L.R. at 433–34. 
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terror link,” referred to the plaintiff by name and address.297  It 
said, “The FBI wants to question a white British Muslim computer 
expert . . . about his alleged links to Osama bin Laden’s terror net-
work.”298  Police in Britain had seized his computers.299  The Tele-
graph’s defense included a plea of justification: “In so far as the 
words complained of . . . bore or were understood to bear the 
meaning that the police suspected the claimant of involvement in 
terror-related activities on reasonable and/or strong grounds, they 
are true in substance and in fact.”300 
The trial judge rejected the plea of justification to the extent it 
was founded on it being true that the police suspected the plaintiff 
of involvement in terror-related activities.301  He required that the 
plea be amended to read: “In so far as the words complained of . . . 
bore or were understood to bear the meaning that there were rea-
sonable and/or strong grounds for suspecting the claimant of in-
volvement in terror-related activities, they are true in substance and 
in fact.”302  In the court of appeal, defense counsel submitted that 
there were two different meanings that the articles could be found 
to have—“(a) that the police suspected the claimant of involve-
ments in terror-related activities” and “(b) that the claimant was 
suspected of such activities on grounds that were reasonable and/or 
strong”303—and that the first meaning could be justified by evi-
dence that Scotland Yard did regard the plaintiff as a suspect and 
had seized his computer and other property.  With the plaintiff’s 
counsel conceding that “the two meanings could be split in this 
way,”304 the court of appeal held that the defendants could restate 
their justification defense as counsel had proposed, provided the 
defense made a clear distinction between the two meanings and 
clearly showed which of the meanings the facts alleged in the de-
 
297  Id. at [13], [2005] 1 W.L.R. at 2285, [2004] E.M.L.R. at 433–34. 
298  Id. at [13], [2005] 1 W.L.R. at 2285, [2004] E.M.L.R. at 434.   
299  Id. at [13], [2005] 1 W.L.R. at 2285; [2004] E.M.L.R. at 435.  The plaintiff was a 
convert to Islam. Id. at [2], [2005] 1 W.L.R. at 2284, [2004] E.M.L.R. at 432. 
300  Id. at [20], [2005] 1 W.L.R. at 2286, [2004] E.M.L.R. at 436.   
301  Id. at [16]–[27], [2005] 1 W.L.R. at 2286–87 (part of judgment omitted), [2004] 
E.M.L.R. at 436–39.  
302  Id. at [16], [2005] 1 W.L.R. at 2286–87, [2004] E.M.L.R. at 436.  
303  Id. at [29], [2004] E.M.L.R. at 439 (omitted in W.L.R.). 
304  Id. at [32], [2004] E.M.L.R. at 440 (omitted in W.L.R.). 
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fense (“particulars of justification”) applied to.305  This decision 
implies that if it is found that a publication carried the meaning that 
the police regarded the plaintiff as a suspect without also carrying 
the meaning that there were reasonable grounds for this, it could be 
justified by showing that the police regarded the plaintiff as a sus-
pect.  Reasonable grounds for the suspicion would not have to be 
proved.306 
The South African case, Independent Newspapers Holdings 
Ltd. v. Suliman,307 involved a front page article in the Cape Times 
newspaper published a few days after a bomb exploded at Cape 
Town’s Victoria and Alfred Waterfront complex.  Two people had 
been killed and many more were seriously injured.308  The article 
stated that after receiving an anonymous “tip-off,” “[d]etectives 
probing Tuesday’s horrific Waterfront blast . . . arrested three 
Capetonians about to board an Egypt-bound flight at Cape Town 
International Airport.”309  The three (a married couple and their 
female cousin) were identified by name, age and place of resi-
dence.310  The article reported a statement by the chief of opera-
tions of the South African Police: “There is the possibility that they 
could be involved in the blast, but at this stage there is no evidence 
pointing to this.”311  The article also reported that the two women 
would be charged with passport offenses and the “male suspect” 
was being held for further questioning.312  The article was illus-
trated by a photograph of this man being led away by police with 
his hands cuffed behind his back.313 
The “male suspect” named in the article sued the proprietor, 
publisher, distributor and editor of the Cape Times.314  He con-
 
305  Id. at [33], [2005] 1 W.L.R. at 2287, [2004] E.M.L.R. at 440. 
306  In Miller v. Associated Newspapers Ltd., [2005] EWHC 21 (Q.B.D.), King was in-
terpreted to allow the fact of suspicion to be used to justify the meaning that there were 
grounds for investigation. Id. at [7]–[9].   
307  Indep. Newspapers Holdings Ltd. v. Suliman, [2004] 3 All SA 137 (S.C.A.).  
308  Id. at 139. 
309  Id. at 140. 
310  Id. 
311  Id. 
312  Id. 
313  Id. at 143.  A later edition of the newspaper contained a similar but not identical ar-
ticle.  Both are reprinted in the case. 
314  Id. at 140. 
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tended that the article conveyed a number of defamatory meanings 
about him that were not true, including that he was responsible for 
a terrorist attack and was about to flee the country because of 
this.315  The trial judge accepted the plaintiff’s assertion that he 
and the two others had been arrested for passport violations, not in 
connection with the explosion, and they had been taken into cus-
tody by the border police, not detectives probing the bombing.316  
The plaintiff admitted that the police had received an anonymous 
report that he might be linked to the explosion and he was leaving 
the country.317 
The judges in this case were in substantial agreement about the 
meaning of the Cape Times article.318  To the reasonable reader, the 
article did not mean that the plaintiff was in fact responsible for the 
Waterfront bombing; it conveyed the defamatory meaning that he 
was arrested and taken into custody because, as a result of a “tip-
off,” the police suspected him of involvement in the bombing and 
he was about to leave the country.319  But the judges were divided 
on whether this meaning was true.320  A 3–2 majority concluded 
that the evidence showed the meaning to be true.321  The border 
police had stopped the plaintiff and arrested him for passport ir-
regularities, but this was done because, on the strength of the “tip-
off,” the police investigating the bombing regarded him as a sus-
pect and wanted to prevent him from leaving South Africa for 
Egypt.322  He was taken to a police station for the purpose of ques-
tioning him as a suspect.  The border police had assisted the inves-
tigation police in achieving their objectives.323  The minority con-
cluded that the meaning was false.  The article’s implication that 
the plaintiff was arrested in connection with the bombing was 
 
315  Id. at 144. 
316   Id. at 147. 
317  Id.  
318  Id. at 166 (Nugent, J.A., with whom Ponnan, A.J.A., concurred). 
319  Id. at 153 (Marais, J.A., with whom Scott, J.A., and Mthiyane, J.A., concurred). 
320  See id. at 155 (Marais, J.A., with whom Scott, J.A., and Mthiyane, J.A., concurred), 
165 (Nugent, J.A., with whom Ponnan, A.J.A., concurred). 
321  Id. at 155 (Marais, J.A., with whom Scott, J.A., and Mthiyane, J.A., concurred). 
322  Id. 
323  Id. 
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false—he had been arrested for a passport irregularity.324  Fur-
thermore, the minority interpreted the article to carry the inference 
that the police had reasonable grounds to suspect the plaintiff of 
involvement in the bombing.325  They did not.  The police arrested 
the plaintiff for the passport infraction because they lacked 
grounds to arrest him for the bombing.326   
Under South African law, the defendants were liable for de-
faming the plaintiff, despite the truth of the defamation, unless 
publication was for the public benefit or in the public interest.327  
The majority held that the “premature disclosure of the identity of 
a suspect” when there was no evidence connecting him to the ex-
plosion, he was not at large, and he had not appeared in court, was 
not for the public benefit or in the public interest, despite the le-
gitimate public interest in knowing the progress of the investiga-
tion of the bombing and whether any arrests had been made.328  
The defendants were, therefore, liable for the defamation.329 
The approach to identification of defamatory meanings in In-
dependent Newspapers Holdings Ltd. v. Suliman is consistent with 
the approach adopted in the English cases.  However, the case adds 
a new dimension to the issue of truth.  The judges focused not on 
whether the defendants proved there were reasonable grounds to 
suspect the plaintiff of involvement in the Waterfront bombing, but 
on whether the Cape Times article was accurate in conveying the 
meaning that the plaintiff was arrested and taken into custody be-
cause the police suspected him of involvement.  The decision that 
publication was not for the public benefit, while not applicable to 
defamation law in either England or the United States, supports the 
 
324  Id. at 167–68 (Nugent, J.A., with whom Ponnan, A.J.A., concurred). 
325  Id. at 166. 
326  Id. at 168.  The trial judge had reached the same conclusions. 
327  Id. at 163. 
328  Id. at 158 (Marais, J.A., with whom Scott, J.A., and Mthiyane, J.A., concurred). 
329  Id. at 159.  The minority disagreed with the majority of the court on this point also.  
The minority was of the opinion that the arrest of a person, particularly on a serious 
charge, is always a matter of public concern and that this included the identity of the per-
son arrested.  Publication of a report that identified the person arrested was therefore in 
the public interest.  This was not a circumstance in which suppression of truthful infor-
mation was justified. Id. at 163–64 (Nugent, J.A., with whom Ponnan, A.J.A., concurred).  
The minority did not take a position on whether it would be in the public interest to iden-
tify a person as a suspect or under investigation when the person was not arrested. 
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view that, at least in some circumstances, the truth of a report that 
a person is a suspect in a serious crime is not in itself sufficient jus-
tification for the harm to the person caused by the report’s publica-
tion. 
D. Possible Criticisms of the English Approach 
English case law now identifies three different potential de-
famatory meanings or levels of defamation in statements that a 
person or entity is under investigation for wrongdoing or a suspect: 
the meaning that the plaintiff has committed a wrongful act, the 
meaning that there are reasonable grounds to suspect that the plain-
tiff committed a wrongful act (with the implication of conduct by 
the plaintiff that gave rise to a reasonable suspicion), and the 
meaning that there are grounds to investigate whether the plaintiff 
was responsible for such an act.330  Arguably the meaning that the 
plaintiff is a suspect is a fourth distinct category of defamatory 
meaning.331 
This differentiation of defamatory meanings can be criticized 
on the grounds that the categories are artificial constructs that vary 
only in the degree of suspicion created and do not conform to what 
the ordinary reader or viewer of news reports thinks about a person 
identified as a suspect or under investigation.  The court of appeal 
has acknowledged the difficulty of separating the “level two” (rea-
sonable grounds to suspect) and “level three” (grounds for investi-
gation) meanings,332 and some judges have said the difference be-
tween the two is “a matter of degree.”333  It could well be 
contended that the essence of all meanings other than the first 
(guilt) is that there is suspicion that the plaintiff committed a 
wrongful act, and the fact that the damage to the plaintiff’s reputa-
tion is greater if it is thought there are reasonable grounds for the 
 
330  See supra text accompanying notes 265–67. 
331  See supra text accompanying notes 303–06. 
332  Jameel v. Times Newspapers Ltd. (Jameel II), [2004] EWCA (Civ) 983, [18] [2004] 
E.M.L.R. 31, 665, 675–76 (C.A.); Jameel v. Wall St. Journal Europe Sprl. (Jameel I), 
[2004] EWCA (Civ) 1694, [19]–[21], 2004 E.M.L.R. 6, 89, 103.  
333  Jameel II, [2004] EWCA (Civ) 983, [39], [2004] E.M.L.R. 31, 682 (Longmore, 
L.J.); Al Rajhi Banking & Inv. Corp. v. Wall St. Journal Europe Sprl. (Al Rajhi Banking 
II), [2003] EWHC (QB) 1776, [9].  
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suspicion does not warrant a separate “reasonable grounds to sus-
pect” category of defamation.  Even the “guilt” meaning could be 
seen as a variation of a defamation whose essence is to convey to 
the public that there is a probability that the plaintiff committed a 
crime or other wrongful act.  All of the meanings imply that the 
plaintiff acted, or may have acted, in a way that created suspicion 
of wrongdoing.  Furthermore, the reported fact that law enforce-
ment authorities have investigated the plaintiff or regard the plain-
tiff as a suspect carries the implication that there are reasonable 
grounds for suspicion because of the assumption that law enforce-
ment officials act on reasonable grounds.  There is also the com-
mon assumption that “where there is smoke there is fire.” 
It is standard law that when the defendant published a third 
party’s statement that the plaintiff committed a crime, or published 
a rumor that the plaintiff committed a crime, justification requires 
proof that the plaintiff did commit the crime.334  The effect of pub-
lishing the accusation or rumor would probably be to place the 
plaintiff under suspicion of having committed the crime, not to 
cause most of the public to believe that the plaintiff was guilty, but 
proof of guilt is required to defend on grounds of truth.  Arguably, 
the same should apply to other types of defamation that harm repu-
tation by creating or intensifying the belief that the plaintiff may 
have committed serious wrongdoing.335   
If these criticisms are sound, the breakdown or differentiation 
of defamatory meanings found in the English cases should not be 
adopted elsewhere.  If it is rejected entirely, there would be at most 
two types of meaning to be drawn from a report that the plaintiff is 
a suspect or under investigation—(1) the plaintiff is guilty and (2) 
there is a probability or possibility that the plaintiff is guilty—and 
justification could only be proof of the plaintiff’s guilt.  Alterna-
tively, the English approach could be eschewed to the extent it dif-
ferentiates the meanings of grounds for investigation, being a sus-
 
334  See supra text accompanying notes 4–5. 
335  In Lewis v. Daily Telegraph Ltd., [1964] A.C. 234 (H.L.), publication of a report 
meaning that the plaintiff is suspected of guilt is distinguished from publication of rumors 
and third party statements that the plaintiff is guilty on the ground that these repeat a 
statement that the plaintiff is guilty.  When that statement is communicated, justification 
requires proof of guilt. Id. at 260 (Lord Reid), 274–75 (Lord Hodson), 283–84 (Lord 
Devlin). 
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pect and reasonable grounds for suspicion on account of the plain-
tiff’s conduct, while accepting that a distinction is to be drawn be-
tween these meanings and the meaning that the plaintiff is guilty.  
If so, a publication that did not (on a reasonable interpretation) 
convey the meaning that the plaintiff was guilty could be justified 
without proving the plaintiff’s guilt.  However, it could not be jus-
tified simply by showing that the plaintiff was a suspect or under 
investigation.  The relevant truth would be the existence of 
grounds for the investigation or identification of the plaintiff as a 
suspect.  Those grounds would normally be found in conduct by 
the plaintiff that warranted the investigation or designation as a 
suspect. 
The adoption by the English courts of different categories of 
defamatory meanings seems to have been calculated to relieve me-
dia defendants of the burden of proving the plaintiff’s guilt when 
what was published did not mean that the plaintiff was guilty.  It 
also potentially relieves defendants of the burden of proving con-
duct warranting suspicion by the plaintiff when what was pub-
lished did not imply that the plaintiff engaged in such conduct, but 
only that there were circumstances causing or warranting an inves-
tigation.336  While this could be criticized as overly protective of 
publishers at the expense of individuals and companies whose 
reputations are damaged, it can be defended as a development in 
defamation law that strikes a reasonable balance between affording 
a remedy for damage to the reputation of parties who committed 
no wrongdoing and protecting the media from liability for publish-
ing “true” reports.  It is consistent with defamation law’s long-held 
understanding that it is the truth of the substance of the defamatory 
meanings, not the literal truth of the defendant’s statement, that 
warrants protection from liability,337 and it is precise in identifying 
the defamatory meanings whose truth must be pleaded and proved. 
 
336  See Jameel v. Times Newspapers Ltd. (Jameel II), [2004] EWCA (Civ) 983, [19], 
[2004] E.M.L.R. 31, 676.   
337  DOBBS, supra note 5, at 1150–53; GATLEY, supra note 2, at 274; SACK, supra note 
190, § 3.8.  
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III. IS TRUTH DIFFERENT UNDER THE FIRST AMENDMENT? 
Under the common law, it is the defamatory meaning of the 
matter published by the defendant, not literal accuracy, which de-
termines whether the defense of truth can prevail.  Consequently, 
the literal truth of a report that the plaintiff is a suspect in a crime 
or under investigation for possible criminal activity is not the truth 
that excludes liability for defamation, as far as the common law is 
concerned.  Could application of the First Amendment require a 
different result?  Could truth for First Amendment purposes be the 
literal truth, or something other than the complete truth of the de-
famatory meanings conveyed by the report?  If so, the First 
Amendment would protect against liability when the common law 
does not. 
Supreme Court decisions on the application of the First 
Amendment to defamation liability clearly imply that the First 
Amendment’s guarantees of freedom of speech and freedom of the 
press protect publication of truthful statements.338  If the First 
Amendment requires substantial limitation of defamation liability 
for the publication of false statements, as held in New York 
Times,339 Curtis,340 Gertz341 and other cases, it must also limit li-
ability for publication of true statements.  Garrison v. Louisiana342 
foreclosed liability for true statements critical of public officials.  
A public official could have a defamation action only if the official 
established that the “utterance” was false.343  Dictum in Cox 
Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn344 stated that the defense of truth is 
constitutionally required when the subject of the publication is a 
public official or public figure,345 and a concurring opinion as-
 
338  SMOLLA, supra note 190, §§ 5:5–5:10.  
339  N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 297 (1964).  
340  Curtis Publ’g. Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 155 (1967).  
341  Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 340 (1974). 
342  Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 77 (1964). 
343  Id.  Garrison involved the constitutionality of liability for criminal defamation, but 
the opinion of the Court clearly excludes civil liability for true statements also. Id. at 74.  
Under New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, a public official bringing a defamation action 
would also have to prove that the “utterance” was made with knowledge of or reckless 
disregard for its falsity. 376 U.S. at 279–83 (1964).   
344  Cox Broad. Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469 (1975).  
345  Id. at 490. 
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serted that the First Amendment required the defense of truth in 
private figure cases also.346  In Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. 
Hepps,347 the Supreme Court held that the First Amendment re-
quired the plaintiff in a defamation action to prove the falsity of the 
statement when the “speech” was on a matter of public concern.  
“To ensure that true speech on matters of public concern is not de-
terred,” the common law rule that the defendant bears the burden 
of proving a statement’s truth could no longer be applied when a 
plaintiff sought damages against a media defendant for “speech of 
public concern.”348  For the Court, the legitimate interest allowing 
defamation liability under state law is “the compensation of indi-
viduals for the harm inflicted on them by defamatory false-
hood.”349  The First Amendment also excludes tort liability for 
publishing true statements on the basis of invasion of privacy, at 
least when the information was lawfully obtained and liability is 
not needed “to further a state interest of the highest order.”350 
Supreme Court decisions thus provide a strong basis for a 
claim that the Constitution does not permit defamation liability for 
a true statement.  The Court, however, has never decided whether 
there can be liability for publishing an accurate statement whose 
meanings or implications are not true.  The decisions do not estab-
lish that the accuracy of a statement excludes liability for harm to 
reputation caused by false meanings reasonably found in the 
statement.351  In Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co.,352 the Court ac-
 
346  Id. at 499 (Powell, J., concurring).  
347  Phila. Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767, 778 (1986). 
348  Id. at 776–77.  
349  Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 341 (1974). 
350  Fla. Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524, 541 (1989). 
351  Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, Inc., 501 U.S. 496, 513–18 (1991), can be inter-
preted to adopt “substantial truth” as a criterion of constitutional protection. See C. Tho-
mas Dienes & Lee Levine, Implied Libel, Defamatory Meaning and State of Mind: The 
Promise of New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 78 IOWA L. REV. 237, 269–73 (1993); Neil J. 
Kinkopf, Note, Malice in Wonderland: Fictionalized Quotations and the Constitutionally 
Compelled Substantial Truth Doctrine, 41 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1271, 1280 (1991).  This 
would exclude liability when there were minor inaccuracies but the substance, gist or 
“sting” of the defamatory charge was true.  As discussed earlier, supra text accompany-
ing notes 190–92, the “sting” in a report that a someone is a suspect or under investiga-
tion to ascertain whether he committed a crime is to induce in the report’s readers or 
viewers a suspicion that the person committed or may have committed the crime.  It is 
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cepted that there could be defamation liability for false implica-
tions as well as explicit statements.353 
There are a number of lower court decisions addressing aspects 
of this issue.  Some of the cases involve the question of whether a 
public official or public figure can have a defamation action prem-
ised on false implications found in a publication whose individual 
statements of fact were accurate.  Several courts, drawing on Gar-
rison v. Louisiana and other Supreme Court decisions limiting li-
ability to public officials and public figures, have held that there 
can be no liability in this situation.354  Other courts have decided 
that an action can be maintained, provided the plaintiff proves the 
defendant’s knowledge of or reckless disregard for the false de-
famatory meaning.355  In a defamation action by a plaintiff who is 
not a public official or public figure, the Gertz requirement of 
fault356 would require proof that the defendant was negligent in 
publishing material that the defendant knew or should have known 
carried a false implication.357 
 
therefore erroneous to consider a report to be “substantially true” just because it is correct 
that the person was a suspect or being investigated. 
352  Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1, 19 (1990). 
353  See Toney v. WCCO Television, Midwest Cable & Satellite, Inc., 85 F.3d 383, 394 
(8th Cir. 1996) (opinion by Justice Byron White after retirement from Supreme Court). 
See generally Dienes & Levine, supra note 351; Elizabeth Blanks Hindman, When is the 
Truth not the Truth? Truth Telling and Libel by Implication, 12 COMM. L. & POL’Y 341 
(2007). 
354  See Pietrafeso v. D.P.I., Inc., 757 P.2d 1113 (Colo. App. 1988) (public figures); 
Schaefer v. Lynch, 406 So. 2d 185 (La. 1981) (public officials); Mihalik v. Duprey, 417 
N.E.2d 1238 (Mass. App. Ct. 1981) (public officials); Diesen v. Hessburg, 455 N.W.2d 
446 (Minn. 1990) (plurality opinion), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1119 (1991) (public offi-
cials); cf. Janklow v. Newsweek, Inc., 759 F.2d 644, 649 (8th Cir. 1985), reh’g granted, 
788 F.2d 1300 (8th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 883 (1986) (report of girl’s accusa-
tion of rape by public official not actionable because it was a “materially accurate report 
of historical fact”). 
355  See Stevens v. Iowa Newspapers, Inc., 728 N.W.2d 823, 830 (Iowa 2007); Turner v. 
KTRK Television, Inc., 38 S.W.3d 103, 120 (Tex. 2000) (recognizing a claim of “defa-
mation by implication” caused by juxtaposition of facts or omission of particular facts); 
see also Saenz v. Playboy Enters., Inc., 841 F.2d 1309, 1317 (7th Cir. 1988) (holding that 
a public official could maintain an action for “defamation by innuendo”; liability was not 
limited to publication of explicit charges against the official). 
356  Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 346–48 (1964) (holding that the First 
Amendment prohibits liability without fault in private figure defamation cases).  
357  See Johnson v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 10 F. Supp. 2d 1071, 1075 (D. Minn. 
1998). 
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Perhaps the most relevant cases are those involving the pur-
ported privilege of “neutral reportage,” first recognized in Edwards 
v. National Audubon Society, Inc.358  In Edwards, the Second Cir-
cuit held that “when a responsible, prominent organization . . . 
makes serious charges against a public figure, the First Amend-
ment protects the accurate and disinterested reporting of those 
charges, regardless of the reporter’s private views regarding their 
validity.”359  The rationale of the privilege is that  
[t]he public interest in being fully informed about 
controversies that often rage around sensitive issues 
demands that the press be afforded the freedom to 
report such charges without assuming responsibility 
for them. . . .  What is newsworthy about such accu-
sations is that they were made. . . . [T]he press may 
[not] be required under the First Amendment to 
suppress newsworthy statements merely because it 
has serious doubts regarding their truth.360   
Cases subsequent to Edwards have extended the privilege to 
reports of charges made by prominent individuals, even some not 
considered “responsible,”361 and by public officials,362 when made 
by a party to an existing public controversy. 
 
358  Edwards v. Nat. Audubon Soc’y, Inc., 556 F.2d 113 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 
U.S. 1002 (1977).  Decisions on the existence and extent of the neutral reportage privi-
lege are collected in Jennifer J. Ho, Annotation, Libel and Slander: Construction and Ap-
plication of the Neutral Reportage Privilege, 13 A.L.R.6th 111 (2006), DAVID A. ELDER, 
DEFAMATION: A LAWYER’S GUIDE §§ 3:27–:33 (1993), and SACK, supra note 191, at § 
7.3.2.4.  See also Elder, supra note 47, at 655–723; Joseph A. Russomanno & Kyu Ho 
Youm, “Neutral Reportage” and Its Second Decade, A Marketplace Perspective, 3 
COMM. L. & POL’Y 439 (1998); Kyu Ho Youm, Ten Years of ‘Neutral Reportage’ Doc-
trine: US Approach to Defamatory Republication, 9 J. MEDIA L. & PRAC. 23 (1988); 
Rodney A. Nelson, Comment, Neutral Reportage: Making Sense of Edwards v. National 
Audubon Society, Inc., 20 CAP. U. L. REV. 471 (1991). 
359  Edwards, 556 F.2d at 120. 
360  Id. 
361  Ward v. News Group Int’l, Ltd., 733 F. Supp. 83 (C.D. Cal. 1990) (accusations 
about actor); Sunshine Sportswear & Elecs., Inc. v. WSOC Television, Inc., 738 F. Supp. 
1499, 1510 (D.S.C. 1989) (statements about plaintiff’s deceptive merchandising practices 
made by competitor and president of regional Better Business Bureau); Barry v. Time, 
Inc., 584 F. Supp. 1110, 1122–28 (N.D. Cal. 1984) (accusations by star basketball player 
against head coach of his team).  The court in In re United Press Int’l, 106 B.R. 323 
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When the doctrine of neutral reportage is adopted and applied, 
the “truth” that excludes defamation liability is the fact that the 
charge against the plaintiff was made and accurately reported, not 
the truth of the charge.  But the case law on neutral reportage does 
not establish this as a general First Amendment rule.  Accurate re-
ports of newsworthy accusations have been excluded from the 
privilege when not made by a prominent, responsible party to a 
current public controversy.363  The protection of the neutral report-
age privilege has also been denied when the accused party was not 
a public figure or public official.364  Arguably, there is a general 
public interest in being informed about accusations pertaining to 
significant public issues and the press should have the freedom to 
accurately and neutrally report such accusations—regardless of 
whether the accuser or accused is a public figure or responsible, 
and even when there was not yet any substantial public contro-
versy.365  Courts, however, have not accepted this.  The Second 
 
(D.D.C. 1989), went even further, extending neutral reportage privilege to a wire service 
report about a non-prominent individual’s accusation that the plaintiff was the “godfa-
ther” of underworld crime in Hawaii. Id. at 328–31; see also Orr v. Lynch, 401 N.Y.S.2d 
897, 899 (App. Div. 1978), aff’d, 383 N.E.2d 562 (N.Y. 1978) (accusations against police 
officer by man wounded in exchange of gunfire). Contra Fogus v. Capital Cities Media, 
Inc., 444 N.E.2d 1100, 1101 (Ill. App. Ct. 1982) (privilege inapplicable to accusations by 
arrested youths of abusive conduct by police); DiSalle v. P.G. Publ’g Co., 544 A.2d 
1345, 1354–63 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1988) (reported charge must be made by public figure or 
official); cf. Martin v. Wilson Publ’g Co., 497 A.2d 322, 330 (R.I. 1985) (privilege did 
not extend to reports of rumors in community). 
362  See April v. Reflector-Herald, Inc., 546 N.E. 2d 466, 470 (Ohio Ct. App. 1988)  
(report of sheriff’s statement that plaintiff was fired for stealing).  
363  See Cianci v. New Times Publ’g Co., 639 F.2d 54, 67–70 (2d Cir. 1980); Crane v. 
Ariz. Republic, 729 F. Supp. 698, 710–11 (C.D. Cal. 1989), vacated, 972 F.2d 1511 (9th 
Cir. 1992) (privilege inapplicable when no public controversy prior to publication); 
McManus v. Doubleday & Co., 513 F. Supp. 1383, 1390–91 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (privilege 
inapplicable to report of statement elicited by investigative reporter without prior public 
controversy); see also cases cited supra note 361. 
364   See Crane, 729 F. Supp. at 710; Khawar v. Globe Int’l, Inc., 965 P.2d 696, 706–08 
(Cal. 1998), cert. denied, 526 U.S. 1114 (1999); Owens v. CBS Inc., 527 N.E.2d 1296, 
1308 (Ill. App. Ct. 1988). Contra Reflector-Herald, 546 N.E.2d at 469. 
365   See DOBBS, supra note 5, at 1165; James E. Boasberg, With Malice Toward None: A 
New Look at Defamatory Republication and Neutral Reportage, 13 HASTINGS COMM. & 
ENT. L.J. 455, 481–87 (1991); Keith C. Buell, Note, “Start Spreading the News”: Why 
Republishing Material from “Disreputable” News Reports Must Be Constitutionally Pro-
tected, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 966, 992–1003 (2000). 
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Circuit, after adopting the neutral reportage privilege in Edwards, 
declared:  
The need for the careful limitation of a constitu-
tional privilege for fair reportage is demonstrated by 
the breadth of that defense, which confers immunity 
even for publishing statements believed to be un-
true.  Absent the qualifications set forth . . . in Ed-
wards, all elements of the media would have abso-
lute immunity to espouse and concur in the most 
unwarranted attacks, at least upon any public offi-
cial or figure, based on episodes long in the past and 
made by persons known to be of scant reliability.  
And this, although without any such immunity, the 
media already enjoy the generous protection ac-
corded by New York Times Co. v. Sullivan with re-
spect to erroneous statements of fact or opinion . . . . 
“A member of a civilized society should have some 
measure of protection against unwarranted attack 
upon his honor, his dignity and his standing in the 
community.”366 
In deciding that the neutral reportage privilege had no applica-
tion to accusations against a private figure, regardless of the 
prominence of the party making the accusation, the Supreme Court 
of California reasoned that 
although the public has a legitimate interest in 
knowing that prominent individuals have made 
charges, perhaps unfounded, against a private fig-
ure, recognition of an absolute privilege for the re-
publication of those charges would be inconsistent 
with the United States Supreme Court’s insistence 
on the need for balancing the First Amendment in-
terest in promoting the broad dissemination of in-
formation relevant to public controversies against 
the reputation interests of private figures: “If the 
 
366  Cianci, 639 F.2d at 69–70 (quoting THOMAS I. EMERSON, TOWARD A GENERAL 
THEORY OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT 69 (1967)). 
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scope of the privilege were to include defamations 
of private figures, a neutral reportage route out of 
liability could emasculate the Gertz distinction be-
tween private and public figure plaintiffs.”  
. . . .   
Only rarely will the report of false and defamatory 
accusations against a person who is neither a public 
official nor a public figure provide information of 
value in the resolution of a controversy over a mat-
ter of public concern.  On the other hand, the report 
of such accusations can have a devastating effect on 
the reputation of the accused individual, who has 
not voluntarily elected to encounter an increased 
risk of defamation and who may lack sufficient me-
dia access to counter the accusations .  . . . “[A] rea-
sonable degree of protection for a private individ-
ual’s reputation is essential to our system of ordered 
liberty.”  The availability of a defamation action 
against the source of the falsehood may be an in-
adequate remedy if the source is insolvent or other-
wise unable to respond in damages.367 
A number of courts have rejected entirely the proposition that 
there is a First Amendment privilege of neutral reportage.368  Most 
have done so in the belief that an absolute privilege to report 
newsworthy accusations would be inconsistent with the Supreme 
Court’s decisions on liability for defamation.  The Court has per-
mitted liability for defamation of a public official or public figure 
when the defendant’s knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard for 
 
367  Khawar, 965 P.2d at 707 (1998) (quoting Ray Worthy Campbell, Note, The Devel-
oping Privilege of Neutral Reportage, 69 VA. L. REV. 853, 871 (1983); Brown v. Kelly 
Broad. Co., 771 P.2d 406, 426 (Cal. 1989)).   
368  See Dickey v. CBS Inc., 583 F.2d 1221, 1225–26 (3d Cir. 1978); Newell v. Field 
Enters., Inc., 415 N.E.2d 434, 451–52 (Ill. App. Ct. 1980); McCall v. Courier-Journal & 
Louisville Times Co., 623 S.W.2d 882, 886–87 (Ky. 1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 975 
(1982); Postill v. Booth Newspapers, Inc., 325 N.W.2d 511, 517–18 (Mich. Ct. App. 
1982), appeal denied, 417 Mich. 1050 (1983); Hogan v. Herald Co., 446 N.Y.S.2d 836, 
841–42 (N.Y. App. Div. 1982), aff’d, 444 N.E.2d 1002 (N.Y. 1982); Norton v. Glenn, 
860 A.2d 48, 56–57 (Pa. 2004), cert. denied, 544 U.S. 956 (2005); Janklow v. Viking 
Press, 378 N.W.2d 875, 879–81 (S.D. 1985).   
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truth is proved.369  Under St. Amant v. Thompson,370 reckless dis-
regard includes publication when the defendant has serious doubts 
about the truth of what is published.371  While the defendant in a 
neutral reportage case might have accurately reported the accusa-
tion against the plaintiff, the defendant might have had serious 
doubts about the truth of the accusation or a belief that it was false.  
Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.,372 the principal decision on liability 
when the plaintiff is not a public official or a public figure, is in-
terpreted to allow considerable protection to the reputational inter-
ests of private figures and to require that First Amendment limita-
tion of liability depend upon the plaintiff’s status as a public or 
private person, not the newsworthiness of the defamatory state-
ment.373   
The view that recognition of a neutral reportage privilege is in-
consistent with Supreme Court decisions may be wrong.374  Cases 
subsequent to Gertz, especially Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Green-
moss Builders, Inc.375 and Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. 
Hepps,376 have made clear that First Amendment protection from 
defamation liability does depend on the public interest in the 
statement as well as the status of the defamed party.  Accurate neu-
tral reportage of a newsworthy but doubtful accusation does not 
involve the serious culpability the Supreme Court had in mind 
when it required proof of what it labelled “actual malice”377 for li-
 
369  See Curtis Publ’g Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 151–53 (1967); N.Y. Times Co. v. 
Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279–80 (1964). 
370  St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727 (1968). 
371  Id. at 731. 
372  Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974). 
373  Several cases have so interpreted St. Amant, Gertz and other Supreme Court deci-
sions. See, e.g., Dickey, 583 F.2d at 1225–26 (noting that the neutral reportage privilege 
stems from the newsworthiness of the statement published rather than the plaintiff’s 
status as a public or private figure); Newell, 415 N.E.2d at 451–52; Hogan, 446 N.Y.S.2d 
at 842; Norton, 860 A.2d at 53–57.  
374  See Boasberg, supra note 365, at 470–74; Comm. on Commc’ns & Media Law, 
Assoc. of the Bar of the City of N.Y., The Neutral Report Privilege, 53 REC. 686, 715–19 
(1998); Note, Libel and the Reporting of Rumor, 92 YALE L.J. 85, 98–104 (1982). 
375  Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749 (1985). 
376  Phila. Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767 (1986). 
377  In substance, publication with knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard for falsity. 
N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279–82 (1964). 
VOL19_BOOK1_KUTNER 12/2/2008  5:44:28 PM 
2008] TRUE SUSPECTS AND FALSE DEFAMATION 65 
                                           
ability to a public official or public figure.378  However, the predic-
tion of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania379 that the U.S. Su-
preme Court would not adopt the neutral reportage doctrine may 
well be correct. 
Neutral reportage of a person’s being a suspect in a crime or 
under investigation for wrongdoing is not entirely analogous to 
neutral reportage of accusations.  There is a very substantial public 
interest in protection from crime and in effective investigation and 
prosecution of illegal activity, and the investigation in most cases 
is conducted by a law enforcement agency of the government, so a 
claim to First Amendment protection against defamation actions 
might have more weight than when accusations are reported.  
However, the two situations are sufficiently similar for the law on 
neutral reportage of accusations to be applied to reports identifying 
a person as a suspect or object of investigation.  In both, the plain-
tiff seeks a remedy for harm to reputation caused by the false sus-
picion of wrongdoing that results from the media report, and the 
defendant’s claim to First Amendment protection rests upon the 
truth of the report and the public interest in being informed.   
If the analogy is accepted, under the current state of the case 
law the First Amendment does not protect media reports that a per-
son is a suspect or under investigation on the basis of the truth of 
the report.  Liability may arise from such reports on account of the 
false defamatory implications they convey.  Possibly there is a 
special area of First Amendment protection when there is already a 
public controversy about the investigation or responsibility for the 
crime, as in the Hatfill case,380 or when the plaintiff is a public of-
ficial or (less persuasively) a public figure, as with Michael Jack-
son.381  Otherwise, liability is limited only by the requirements that 
fault382 and the falsity of the defamatory meaning be proved. 
 
378  See Dienes & Levine, supra note 351, at 252–54, 303–04, 320 (liability only for 
“calculated falsehood”). 
379  Norton v. Glenn, 860 A.2d 48, 57 (Pa. 2004). 
380  See supra text accompanying notes 108–80. 
381  See supra text accompanying notes 16–21. 
382  See supra text accompanying notes 356–57.  Knowing falsehood or reckless disre-
gard for truth is required when the plaintiff is a public figure or public official. See Curtis 
Publ’g Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 164 (1967); N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 
279–80 (1964). 
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The Supreme Court may eventually be persuaded that the First 
Amendment does protect an accurate report that a person is a sus-
pect or under investigation, even when the reporter or publisher did 
not believe the person was guilty of anything.  That may well be 
the correct resolution of the issue.  However, until the Supreme 
Court does so decide, the operating assumption should be that the 
First Amendment does not categorically protect such reports and 
that the truth that excludes defamation liability continues to be the 
truth of the defamatory meaning conveyed by the report.383 
REVIEW AND CONCLUSIONS 
If a media report conveys the meaning that a person is sus-
pected of committing a serious crime, or is being investigated to 
determine whether criminal acts were committed, the report is de-
famatory.  The report is defamatory because of its natural tendency 
to cause its recipients to believe that the subject of the report may 
have committed a crime, and thus to damage the person’s reputa-
tion.  A report is usually defamatory also when its meaning is that 
a person is suspected of or under investigation for assisting the 
commission of serious criminal acts by others—for example, as-
sisting the commission of fraud or providing financial support to 
persons involved in terrorism.  The damage to personal or business 
reputation caused by such reports may have serious consequences.  
An individual may lose employment, or an opportunity for em-
ployment or appointment to office, even if the individual is cleared 
of all wrongdoing.  A company or charitable organization may in-
cur a large financial loss that cannot be recouped. 
As reports of this nature are defamatory, the person or entity 
who is the subject of the report may bring a defamation action 
against the report’s publisher and author.  However, a defamation 
action cannot succeed if the report’s publication was protected by 
common law privilege or First Amendment rules on defamation li-
ability, and it cannot succeed if liability is excluded by the truth of 
 
383  See Elder, supra note 47 (arguing at length that under the Supreme Court’s deci-
sions, determinations of falsity and fault are to be based on whether there is “underlying 
falsity,” not accuracy or inaccuracy in the reportage of defamatory statements).  
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the report.  Truth is a complete defense (“justification”) to any ac-
tion for libel or slander. 
The central concern of this article is: in what sense must the re-
port be true for its publisher to be protected from defamation liabil-
ity?  A defendant would contend that if the report was accurate in 
its meaning that the person was a suspect or under investigation, 
the report is true and therefore there is no liability.  A plaintiff 
would contend that the truth that excludes liability is the truth of 
the defamatory meaning, and that requires proof that the plaintiff 
was guilty of what the plaintiff was reportedly being investigated 
for or suspected of.  A court might reject both contentions and in-
stead link truth to proof of certain meanings the report could be 
found to convey, including the meaning that the plaintiff had en-
gaged in conduct warranting the suspicion or investigation.  The 
First Amendment might be interpreted to protect true reports from 
liability in a way that the common law does not.  The issue of 
“What is truth?” is closely connected to the question of what de-
famatory meaning or meanings the report conveyed to its readers 
or viewers.384 
The defense of truth did not gain acceptance in the common 
law because of a policy of encouraging the exposure of wrongful 
conduct or solicitude for freedom of speech.  The modern rationale 
for the defense is that the plaintiff does not deserve to recover 
damages when the matter published by the defendant was correct 
about the plaintiff’s conduct or character.385  “[T]he truth is an an-
swer to the action . . . because it shews that the plaintiff is not enti-
tled to recover damages.  For the law will not permit a man to re-
cover damages in respect of an injury to a character which he 
either does not, or ought not, to possess.”386  This rationale sup-
 
384  See GATLEY, supra note 2, at 274–75. 
385  See HARPER, JAMES & GRAY, supra note 4, § 5.20 at 189; FREDERICK POLLOCK, THE 
LAW OF TORTS 266–67 (13th ed. 1929). 
386  M’Pherson v. Daniels, 10 B. & C. 263, 272, 109 Eng. Rep. 448, 451 (K.B. 1829) 
(Littledale, J.).  This was endorsed in Watkin v. Hall, L.R. 3 Q.B. 396, 400–01 (Q.B. 
1868) (Blackburn, J.), and has been quoted with approval in the House of Lords and 
American courts. See Reynolds v. Times Newspapers Ltd., [2001] 2 A.C. 127, 192 (Lord 
Nicholls of Birkenhead); Plato Films Ltd. v. Speidel, [1961] A.C. 1090, 1146 (H.L.) 
(Lord Morris of Borth-y-Gest); Savannah News-Press, Inc. v. Hartridge, 138 S.E.2d 173, 
176 (Ga. Ct. App. 1964); Oles v. Pittsburg Times, 2 Pa. Super. 130, 143 (1896); see also 
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ports the contention that the plaintiff’s guilt must be proved to jus-
tify a publication whose meaning is that the plaintiff is or should 
be suspected of wrongdoing.  An innocent plaintiff would not be 
attempting to “recover damages in respect of an injury to a charac-
ter [reputation] which he either does not, or ought not, to pos-
sess.”387  An innocent plaintiff is not undeserving of recovery for 
harm to reputation caused by the defendant, except perhaps when 
the plaintiff engaged in improper conduct that warranted a suspi-
cion that the plaintiff was guilty of a wrongful act. 
The policies of the First Amendment, which influence deci-
sions on tort liability even when it is not decided that liability 
would violate the Amendment, are of course very different.  It is 
clear from New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, Philadelphia Newspa-
pers, Inc. v. Hepps and other defamation cases that the First 
Amendment is interpreted to encourage truthful and even only ar-
guably truthful media publication on matters of public interest and 
to restrain deterrents to the publication of information thought to 
be true.  This is achieved by applying the First Amendment so as to 
give substantial protection against risks of liability.  Media report-
ing portraying individuals and organizations as suspects in the 
commission of terrorist acts or giving financial support to terrorists 
presents the most acute conflict between defamation law’s object 
of providing a remedy for undeserved harm to reputation and the 
interests of the public and media in contemporary news reportage 
on matters of great public concern. 
In the United States and elsewhere, courts appear to be very re-
luctant to have the media risk defamation liability for publishing a 
report that a person is a suspect or under investigation whenever 
the person is not actually guilty.  In the reported cases, most of the 
 
Curtis Publ’g Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 151 (1967); Castle v. Houston, 19 Kan. 417, 
424–25 (1877).  For other possible rationales, see ELDREDGE, supra note 4, at 329–31; 
Bertram Harnett & John V. Thornton, The Truth Hurts: A Critique of a Defense to Defa-
mation, 35 VA. L. REV. 425, 432–37 (1949); Roy Robert Ray, Truth: A Defense to Libel, 
16 MINN. L. REV. 43, 54–58 (1931). 
387  Cf. Oles v. Pittsburg Times, 2 Pa. Super. 130 (1896) (newspaper was held liable for 
accurately reporting that the plaintiff’s neighbors believed she practiced witchcraft and 
caused a boy to be “possessed of devils.”). 
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courts have found some way to avoid the conclusion that the de-
fendant is liable when the plaintiff was not guilty of wrongdoing. 
In some American cases, courts have ruled that the defendant 
was not liable for reporting that the plaintiff was being investigated 
or suspected because it was true that the plaintiff was being inves-
tigated or suspected.  These decisions are simplistic and erroneous.  
They fail to recognize that it is the truth of the defamatory mean-
ings of a statement, not literal truth, that excludes liability.  They 
are also inconsistent with the well-established rule that when a 
third party’s statement is repeated, accuracy in communicating the 
statement does not show truth.  The truth of the statement’s sub-
stance must be shown.  In other U.S. cases, courts have examined 
the meaning of what the defendant published to the extent of de-
termining whether it meant that the plaintiff was guilty, or only 
that the plaintiff was under suspicion or investigation.  If the mean-
ing was that the plaintiff was guilty, proof of guilt was required to 
show truth.  But when the meaning was only that the plaintiff was 
a suspect or being investigated, these courts have allowed defen-
dants to prevail on a showing that it was true that the plaintiff was 
a suspect or being investigated as the defendant had reported.  
There are a few better-reasoned decisions in American courts that 
connect the issue of truth to the defamatory meanings of what was 
published and the harm to reputation that resulted. 
The English courts—which have addressed this subject at the 
highest level, the House of Lords—have developed an approach 
that requires trial and appellate judges to decide what specific de-
famatory meanings a report can be found to convey and whether 
the defendant has alleged or proved facts showing that a specific 
meaning was true.  At least three distinct meanings might be found 
in a media report identifying the plaintiff as a suspect or target of 
an investigation: (1) the plaintiff has committed a wrongful act, (2) 
there are reasonable grounds to suspect that the plaintiff committed 
a wrongful act (with the implication of conduct by the plaintiff that 
gave rise to a reasonable suspicion), and (3) there are grounds to 
investigate whether the plaintiff committed a wrongful act.  That 
the plaintiff is a suspect might be a fourth type of defamatory 
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meaning.388  The newspaper articles involved in the reported cases 
have usually been interpreted not to convey the meaning that the 
plaintiff was guilty.  As a consequence, the defendant did not have 
to plead and prove that the plaintiff was guilty in order to prevail 
on the ground of truth.  The articles usually were, however, found 
to convey the meaning that there were reasonable grounds to sus-
pect that the plaintiff was guilty.  This meaning could be “justi-
fied” only by pleading and proving that the plaintiff had so con-
ducted himself (or herself or itself) as to create reasonable grounds 
for suspicion. 
The English decisions are sophisticated and consistent with es-
tablished principles of defamation law.  They may, however, go 
too far in drawing narrow distinctions among defamatory meanings 
that differ in degree rather than kind.  An American court would be 
well advised to be guided by the English and Commonwealth case 
law on the major points but avoid some of the subsidiary com-
plexities.  At a minimum, American courts should understand from 
the case law in jurisdictions outside the United States, as well as 
the case law within, that it is necessary to identify the specific de-
famatory meanings conveyed by the defendant’s report and that the 
defense of truth is established by proof that the defamatory mean-
ings are true, not by showing that the plaintiff was investigated for 
illegal activity or regarded as a suspect.  The approach adopted by 
the English courts does not fully vindicate innocent plaintiffs’ 
claims to a remedy for damage to reputation caused by false suspi-
cions of wrongdoing, and it does not accept media defendants’ 
claims to be free of liability when a report that the plaintiff was a 
suspect or being investigated was correct.389  It does, however, 
strike a reasonable balance between the two. 
 
388  If it is decided by the court that a report could be found to have a particular meaning, 
or that the pleadings and evidence produced by the defendant are sufficient to show justi-
fication, a jury would determine whether the report did convey the meaning and, if so, 
whether the meaning was true. See GATLEY, supra note 2, at 1022–26, 1029.   
389   See, however, the decision of the House of Lords in the Jameel litigation that is dis-
cussed supra in the text accompanying notes 194–97.  Extending further the qualified 
privilege invented in Reynolds v. Times Newspapers Ltd., [2001] 2 A.C. 127 (H.L.), for 
responsible journalism reporting information of public interest, the House held that the 
privilege applied to the Wall Street Journal article and the Journal was not liable for pub-
lishing it. Jameel (Mohammed) v. Wall St. Journal Europe Sprl., [2007] 1 A.C. 359 
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Whether the First Amendment will be interpreted to preclude 
liability when the description of the plaintiff as a suspect or under 
investigation was correct is an open question.  Supreme Court de-
cisions do support the argument that the First Amendment must 
protect true publications from liability, and it seems incongruous to 
allow liability for an accurate report when the Supreme Court has 
decided that the First Amendment requires substantial restrictions 
on defamation liability for reports that are not true.  However, the 
Supreme Court has never decided that a defamation action cannot 
be based on false implications in an accurate statement.  The deci-
sions of the lower courts relevant to this issue are divided.  The re-
jection of a “neutral reportage” privilege by some courts and the 
limitations within which the privilege has been confined by other 
courts suggest that “neutral reportage” of law enforcement investi-
gations and investigators’ conclusions enjoys no specific First 
Amendment protection from defamation actions. 
If reporting that a person is a suspect or under investigation is 
not protected by either the common law defense of truth or a First 
Amendment freedom to publish true statements, the risk of defa-
mation liability is nevertheless low in the United States.  One rea-
son is that an accurate report of a statement by an official of a gov-
ernmental law enforcement agency, or the details or conclusions of 
an investigation conducted by a governmental agency, may be pro-
tected from liability by the common law privilege to report official 
proceedings (the “public proceedings” or “fair report” privilege).  
If this privilege applies, “truth” is the accuracy of the report.  
When the report is an accurate, non-misleading account of gov-
ernmental actions or records, it qualifies as true for purposes of the 
privilege even if what it conveys about the plaintiff is not true.  If 
the privilege applies to reports of statements by police officers or 
prosecutors, a newspaper’s correctly reporting that the police had 
named the plaintiff as a target of a criminal investigation or as a 
suspect in a crime would be privileged even though the plaintiff 
had no involvement in that crime or any similar criminal act.390  
 
(H.L.).  Privilege protects a publisher of defamatory matter from liability when the de-
fense of truth does not. 
390  See, e.g., White v. Fraternal Order of Police, 909 F.2d 512 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (report 
of police investigation initiated because of allegations involving plaintiff); Howard v. 
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A second reason why the risk of liability is low is that no pub-
lic official or public figure who is defamed in that capacity can re-
cover damages without establishing that the defendant published 
the defamatory matter with knowledge of its falsity or reckless dis-
regard for truth or falsity.  Reckless disregard includes publication 
of a statement when the defendant has serious doubts about its 
truth.  This gives some support to an argument that reporting that a 
person is a suspect or the target of an investigation is in reckless 
disregard of truth when the reporter or publisher does not believe 
the person committed any wrongful act.  However, the level of 
culpability intended by the requirement of knowing or reckless 
falsehood, which the Supreme Court characterized as “actual mal-
ice,”391 is not present when the report is accurate.  When the “ac-
tual malice” requirement has been applied, as in the Jackson, Law-
rence and Hatfill cases, courts have ruled that the defendants are 
not liable. 
When the plaintiff is not classified as a public official or public 
figure, the Gertz requirement of no liability without fault applies.  
Whether a media defendant could be found to be at fault when it 
 
Oakland Tribune, 245 Cal. Rptr. 449 (Cal. Ct. App. 1988) (report that plaintiffs were un-
der investigation for misuse of public funds); Turnbull v. Herald Co., 459 S.W.2d 516 
(Mo. Ct. App. 1970) (report that plaintiff was suspected of burglary and receiving stolen 
goods by police); Kilgore v. Koen, 288 P. 192 (Or. 1930) (report that plaintiff was sus-
pected of thefts by sheriff’s officers).  The extent and application of this privilege is a 
large subject outside the scope of this article.  Whether a claim of privilege could succeed 
when it is reported that someone has been subject to investigation or named as a suspect 
would depend upon whether the privilege would be extended beyond reports of official 
acts, such as arrest and prosecution, to generally include reports of actions by government 
officials or reports of statements made by them; whether the privilege would be held to 
include reports of information that was not generally available to the public, such as in-
formation provided by a government official to an individual reporter, or the contents of 
investigative reports that had not been released to the public or the press; and whether the 
privilege would be held to protect reports of statements from a government record or of-
ficial that the reporter or publisher believed were false.  Authority on these points is di-
vided. See generally ELDER, supra note 358, §§ 3:1–:26; ELDREDGE, supra note 4, at 
419–38; HARPER, JAMES & GRAY, supra note 4, § 5.24; SMOLLA, supra note 190, §§ 
8:66–8:78.  Reasons why the privilege may not apply are identified in Jonathan Donnel-
lan & Justin Peacock, Truth and Consequences: First Amendment Protection for Accu-
rate Reporting on Government Investigations, 50 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 237, 238–40, 243, 
253–55 (2005). 
391   N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279–83 (1964). 
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was correct in reporting that the plaintiff was under investigation 
or suspected of unlawful conduct by law enforcement personnel is 
not explored in the cases discussed in this article.  Normally, fault 
would be excluded by the accuracy of the report, or reasonable 
care for accuracy.  However, it could be contended that in view of 
the harm to the plaintiff that would foreseeably be caused by pub-
lication of the report, the defendant reasonably should not have 
published it without at least verifying that there were substantial 
grounds for the investigation of the plaintiff or the description of 
the plaintiff as a suspect and giving some consideration to whether 
it was in the public interest to publish the report. 
There have been some published expressions of concern, in-
cluding Judge Wilkinson’s dissent in the Hatfill case,392 that poten-
tial liability may have chilling effects on the reporting of important 
news.393  However, the risk of liability seems to have had little de-
terrent effect on the American news media.  Reports that a person 
is a suspect in a crime, or that an individual or company is being 
investigated for unlawful conduct, are published all the time, as are 
reports of unverified accusations and even rumors.394  Only a few 
of the individuals, companies and organizations named in these re-
ports have the determination and financial resources to litigate a 
defamation claim against a media defendant.  Some have done so, 
usually without success.  More will do so in the future, probably 
also without much success.  The examples of Richard Jewell, Ste-
ven Hatfill, Michael Jackson, the Global Relief Foundation and 
less prominent parties, such as Emerick Jacobs and Alonzo Law-
rence, offer little hope to innocent or presumptively innocent plain-
tiffs.  Even when it is accepted that the defendant’s publication 
caused or increased damage to the reputation of an innocent party, 
courts in the United States tend to find grounds for holding that the 
defendant is not liable.395 
 
392   See supra text accompanying notes 108–80. 
393   KTRK Television v. Felder, 950 S.W.2d 100, 106 (Tex. App. 1997); SACK, supra 
note 191, § 7.3.2.3; Donnellan & Peacock, supra note 390, at 244. 
394  See Buell, supra note 365, at 986–91.  Judge Wilkinson’s dissent in Hatfill men-
tioned “daily media reports on criminal activity” that identified suspects. Hatfill v. N.Y. 
Times, 427 F.3d 253, 259 (4th Cir. 2005) (Wilkinson, J., dissenting). 
395  See Donnellan & Peacock, supra note 390 (the only substantial work on this topic 
published previously). 
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That result might be correct, but the reasons given for it are 
typically incorrect or incomplete.  As far as defamation law is con-
cerned, a publication is not “true” because it accurately reports the 
conclusions of third parties or otherwise is literally accurate.  What 
is “true” for First Amendment purposes may be different.  If the 
public interest and freedom of the press require that there be no 
defamation liability for correctly informing the public that some-
one is a suspect or under investigation, this should be squarely 
grounded in a rule that the First Amendment protects true reports, 
not achieved by loose or inept applications of defamation law.396 
An award of damages is a rather poor remedy for harm to repu-
tation, but it is the only judicial remedy available.397  If people 
identified as suspects or investigation targets cannot recover dam-
ages or otherwise achieve vindication in a defamation action, their 
only remedy is to communicate the truth, as Abraham Lincoln 
suggested.398  But communicating the truth will not vindicate the 
defamed person, or the publisher of the defamation, unless there is 
an accurate understanding of what “truth” really is.   
  
 
 
396  Donnellan & Peacock, supra note 390, argue for recognition of a First Amendment 
rule barring liability for accurate reports of government investigations and accusations.  
Elder, supra note 47, argues against interpretations of the First Amendment and the com-
mon law that would immunize accurate reports of defamatory matter irrespective of its 
falsity and any fault in publishing it. 
397  American courts do not grant injunctions against defamation or order retraction of 
false statements, and there is no practice of granting declaratory judgments on the truth or 
falsity of a defamatory statement. See DOBBS, supra note 5, at 1193–96; SACK, supra 
note 191, § 10.6; SMOLLA, supra note 190, §§ 9:85–:93. 
398   See supra text accompanying note 1. 
 
